Federal Election Results: Frequently Asked Questions

October 8, 2020
Federal Election Results: Frequently Asked Questions

Several states have implemented new election administration processes in response to the COVID-19 pandemic that could affect how and when ballots are counted. Even under normal circumstances, finalizing federal election results takes days or weeks after election day. Among other steps, state, territorial, and local election officials canvass votes to ensure that ballots are valid and counted accurately. Election observers, audits, and other processes are designed to enhance transparency. This report addresses frequently asked questions on these and related subjects. The discussion emphasizes the period between the time a voter casts a ballot and when election officials certify, or finalize, the results.
Contents

Introduction ........................................................................................................................................ 1
Scope of the Report ........................................................................................................................... 1
What is the difference between returns reported on election night and final results? .............. 3
How do states finalize election results? ........................................................................................... 3
What procedures might election jurisdictions use to provide transparency and
demonstrate that the canvass is conducted correctly? ................................................................. 5
What processes help election officials determine voter eligibility and the validity of
ballots cast? ....................................................................................................................................... 6
When do states count ballots and certify election results? ............................................................... 9
How might the COVID-19 pandemic affect vote count procedures and timing in 2020? .......... 10
How have states responded to potential effects of COVID-19 on the 2020 vote count? .......... 11
What processes are available if disputes remain after election results are certified? ............... 12

Contacts

Author Information .......................................................................................................................... 14
Introduction

The results voters see reported on election night are the culmination of several steps in the election administration process, but are not the end of the process. Each state, territory, and the District of Columbia—which administer federal elections—has its own process for counting votes and declaring winners, but all follow similar steps. Election administrators, political officials, and members of the public continue working after election night to finalize official results. This process typically takes several days or even weeks. State-or territorial-level federal election results in the United States are never official on election night. Amid the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the additional time required to process far more mail ballots than most jurisdictions normally receive led to slower ballot processing times in some primary elections, and is expected to do so again in the November general election.

The current environment also creates the potential for foreign or domestic disinformation campaigns designed to undermine confidence in American elections as the normal counting process occurs amid greater public scrutiny than that process typically receives. On September 22, 2020, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS’s) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) jointly issued a public service announcement noting that “Foreign actors and cybercriminals could exploit the time required to certify and announce elections’ results by disseminating disinformation that includes reports of voter suppression, cyberattacks targeting election infrastructure, voter or ballot fraud, and other problems intended to convince the public of the elections’ illegitimacy.”

These circumstances have generated renewed interest among some Members of Congress, other public officials, and voters about how election officials count votes and determine election results. This report provides brief answers to frequently asked questions about the processes for counting, documenting, and ensuring transparency after votes are cast. It addresses federal elections, although the discussion herein also generally applies to elections for state or local offices.

Professional election administrators manage most or all of the ballot-counting process. Members of the public, the media, or credentialed observers typically monitor most or all of the ballot-counting process. Specific practices and requirements vary by jurisdiction. Election officials develop standard practices to document the chain of custody for ballots, ensure transparency, and generate accurate results.

Scope of the Report

The frequently asked questions below are designed to provide a resource for Members of Congress and congressional staff as they conduct oversight and consider legislation related to

---


Federal Election Results: Frequently Asked Questions

federal elections. The discussion emphasizes the period between when voters cast ballots and election officials certify election results for federal elections. Because states, territories, and localities administer federal elections, the report contains general discussion of law, policy, and practice in those jurisdictions, but does not attempt to do so comprehensively. The report briefly discusses recounts and contested elections, but those topics are largely beyond the scope of this report. Other CRS products provide information on related topics concerning contested U.S. House elections, the electoral college, and the congressional role in verifying and counting presidential election results. The report is intentionally brief to make the content more accessible. It does not discuss legislation or identify specific requirements and processes in individual jurisdictions. As such, the general information presented in this report does not assess any election jurisdiction’s processes for or performance at administering elections. Similarly, the report does not provide specific compliance information, legal analysis, or policy analysis about critical infrastructure issues. Other CRS reports provide additional information about elections policy issues generally.

---

4 Federal law typically has relatively little effect on the process of counting and finalizing election results. As noted elsewhere in this report, other CRS products provide additional information about federal and constitutional provisions regarding contests, recounts, and certifying electoral college results.


Brief Background: Ballot Submission to Election Results

Election jurisdictions around the country use various processes and terminology to count ballots and obtain election results. The information noted below is generally applicable and abbreviated. Additional detail appears in the questions and answers in the text of this report. State, territorial, and local election jurisdictions document and publicize their individual requirements.

- **Submitting Ballots.** Voters deposit completed (also called “marked”) ballots in a ballot box or scanner at in-person polling places. Mail and early in-person ballots are received at designated sites across a precinct or at a central location.

- **Tabulating Ballots.** Ballots are counted, or tabulated, where they are cast, at centralized election offices, or both. These tabulations may occur multiple times to verify the accuracy of the total ballot count.

- **Canvassing Ballots.** Election officials aggregate ballot totals and document and reconcile questions about ballot validity through a process known as the canvass.

- **Certifying Results.** Final election results are called certified results. State-level certification occurs after the canvass (and, if required in that state, after audits).

As discussed in the questions and answers in the text of this report, a combination of professional election administrators, volunteers, and members of the public may be involved in these steps, depending on jurisdiction. Documenting chain of custody for ballots, following established procedures for observing elections and challenging ballots, and auditing results also help ensure transparency and accuracy.

What is the difference between returns reported on election night and final results?

Federal election results at the state or territorial levels are never official in the United States until after election day. Results appearing in media reports or that election jurisdictions release on election night are unofficial and preliminary. These initially reported (either by the media or election officials) totals do not necessarily include all ballots submitted in the jurisdiction, have not been subject to the canvassing process, and could change. Consequently, in 2020 and before, it is normal and expected that final election totals differ from those announced on election night. It is also common that the candidates in various races can trade leads throughout election night and after, as additional ballots are counted. Typically, it takes several days or weeks to finalize election results through the canvass (and audits, where applicable) and certify a winner. State or territorial law sets deadlines for how and when these processes occur.

How do states finalize election results?

Although individual procedures vary by state, finalizing election results typically involves two major steps, the canvass and certification. The canvass involves assembling and verifying all validly cast ballots so that they can be aggregated into the final official election results (generally called certified results). As an Election Assistance Commission publication explains, “The purpose of the canvass is to account for every ballot cast and ensure that every valid vote cast is included in the election totals. This involves accounting for every absentee ballot, every early

---


voting ballot, every ballot cast on Election Day, every provisional ballot, every challenged ballot, and every overseas and military ballot.” Depending on jurisdiction, groups of professional election officials, appointed canvassing boards, or both conduct the canvass.

Typical steps in the canvass include reconciling any discrepancies in the number of ballots issued versus those cast; duplicating damaged ballots that scanners cannot read, documenting that process, and counting the duplicated ballots; if applicable, addressing discrepancies in signatures or cast ballots (e.g., questions about voter intent based on ballot markings); and reconciling the number of ballots cast with the number of voters who voted in person at the polling place. These processes may be repeated multiple times as precincts and vote centers compile their results and balloting information is consolidated at subsequently higher levels of election administration (e.g., precinct, county, and state).

In some jurisdictions, statistical data and written reports accompany the certified results and provide additional information about the canvassing process and how discrepancies were addressed. Similarly, in some cases, the certification is the final step in the canvassing process. In others, the governor or chief state election official (e.g., secretary of state) issues certified results based on information provided in the canvassing authority’s final report or meeting.

In some states, very close election margins during the canvass trigger recounts, discussed at the end of this report. Some jurisdictions also conduct postelection audits, which are intended to check the accuracy of the election results. These audits involve comparing the results generated by the election system against a sample of paper records of the vote, such as paper ballots or the voter-verifiable paper audit trails generated by direct-recording electronic voting machines.

---

12 U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Quick Start Management Guide: Canvassing and Certifying an Election, October 2008, p. 3. For additional discussion of military and overseas citizen voting, see, for example, CRS In Focus IF11642, Absentee Voting for Uniformed Services and Overseas Citizens: Roles and Process, In Brief; by R. Sam Garrett.


15 Exactly how jurisdictions that use postelection audits conduct them varies, but postelection audits generally can be grouped into two categories: (1) traditional postelection audits, which sample a fixed percentage of voting districts or machines, and (2) risk-limiting audits, which use statistical methods to determine how many districts or machines have to be sampled to achieve a specified level of confidence that the election results are accurate. For more information about postelection audits in general or risk-limiting audits in particular, see National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy, Washington, DC, 2018, pp. 93-96, https://www.nap.edu/catalog/25120/securing-the-vote-protecting-american-democracy; National Conference of State Legislatures, Post-Election Audits, October 25, 2019, at https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/post-election-audits635926066.aspx; and Mark Lindeman and Philip B. Stark, “A Gentle Introduction to Risk-Limiting Audits,” IEEE Security and Privacy, vol. 10, no. 5 (September-October 2012), pp. 42-49.
What procedures might election jurisdictions use to provide transparency and demonstrate that the canvass is conducted correctly?

Election officials work to ensure that the certified election results they provide are generally perceived to be fair, accurate, and legitimate. One way they do so is by having consistent, reliable, and transparent ballot collection and canvass procedures, which are typically established well before the election. To ensure that individual voters can cast their ballots privately and securely, and that those ballots are handled and counted correctly, multiple election administrators and/or public witnesses, representing multiple political parties, generally are involved at various stages of the vote-collating and-counting processes.

Certain categories of individuals can serve as election observers, as defined by state laws; these observers typically include individuals serving on behalf of various political parties and can also include individuals from nonpartisan civic or legal organizations, as well as academics or unaffiliated individuals. States may require potential observers to obtain certain accreditation.\(^{16}\) An important role for observers under some state laws is monitoring in-person voting on election day for indications of voter coercion, intimidation, or fraud, as well as technological issues and administrative errors or misapplication of election protocols.\(^{17}\)

States that utilize drop boxes for mail ballots often have video surveillance or trained election staff monitoring the drop box site during voting and have mechanisms in place for ballot retrieval and chain of custody,\(^{18}\) such as deploying two individuals to collect ballots from each box.\(^{19}\) Other elements of the voting process, including signature verification for mail ballots, typically also involve multiple individuals.\(^{20}\)

---

\(^{16}\) National Conference of State Legislatures, Policies for Election Observers, October 12, 2016, at https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/policies-for-election-observers.aspx. This CRS report does not address federal election observers or monitors that may be deployed under the Voting Rights Act. For brief additional discussion, see CRS Report R45302, Federal Role in U.S. Campaigns and Elections: An Overview, by R. Sam Garrett.


In many states, canvassing boards and processes include participants who were not directly involved in the administration of the election itself to help provide impartial review.21 Most states also allow some election observers or members of the media to access certain postelection procedures,22 such as counting absentee ballots or conducting postelection audits or logic and accuracy tests.23 Some jurisdictions may also provide a canvass livestream and allow the public to view the process online.24 Postelection audits may be conducted by an independent audit board, rather than state or local administrators.25

What processes help election officials determine voter eligibility and the validity of ballots cast?

State and local election officials use various mechanisms to ensure that only eligible voters cast ballots and that each voter only votes once in an election. The specific processes vary by state and can further vary based on the type of ballot cast (e.g., in-person or by mail).

Election officials primarily use voter registration data to determine whether or not an individual is eligible to vote in a given election, regardless of whether the voter chooses to vote in-person or via a mail (or absentee) ballot.26 Election officials use state-level voter registration requirements and procedures,27 as well as verification requirements under the Help America Vote Act of 2002...
(HAVA), to confirm a registrant’s identity and eligibility to vote, often by comparing information on voter registration applications with other government agency records.

Once a voter is on a state’s list of eligible voters, this information is used by election officials to monitor how, and if, voters have received a ballot, to ensure that each eligible voter can cast a vote and that no voter casts multiple ballots in the same election. When voting in-person, poll books, or lists of eligible voters, are used by local election administrators to confirm that individuals are currently registered voters and are at the correct voting location for their precinct or election district. Electronic (or e-poll) books are commonly used today and may be able to provide more recently updated voter information or some voter data in real time. In jurisdictions that use centralized vote centers, e-poll books can help election administrators verify that a voter has not previously voted at another location. In addition to identifying voters from poll book records, 35 states also have some form of voter identification requirement in effect for in-person voting during the 2020 election.

In circumstances where voters can vote by mail, some jurisdictions automatically send ballots to voters and others require voters to request a mail ballot. States that automatically send ballots or ballot request forms to voters generally rely upon address information on file in state voter registration records. In the voter records, election administrators typically note which persons have requested and cast absentee ballots. Ballot tracking measures often allow an individual voter to check the status of his or her mail ballot, following it from the time it is sent out by election administrators to when it is returned and cast. These mail ballot tracking measures, in conjunction with in-person voting records, also help election officials to ensure that only a single ballot is counted for each voter; for example, election officials can void a mail ballot if it has not

28 Under HAVA, for example, voter registration applicants must provide a current and valid driver’s license number, the last four digits of their Social Security number, or an alternate, unique identifying number assigned by the state for voter registration purposes (52 U.S.C. §21083(a)(5)(A)(i-ii)). HAVA also requires that states coordinate their voter registration lists with state agency records on felony status and state agency records on death (52 U.S.C. §21083(a)(2)(A)(ii)), and directs state DMV officials to enter into agreements with the Social Security Administration and with the chief state election official to verify and match certain voter registration applicant information (52 U.S.C. §21083(a)(5)(B)). HAVA also requires that new voters who submit a voter registration application by mail, and have not previously voted in a federal election in a state, must provide a current and valid photo identification or present “a current utility bill, bank statement, government check, paycheck, or other government document that shows the name and address of the voter,” along with their registration application or when they vote for the first time (52 U.S.C. §21083(b)); individuals who fall into this category and are unable to provide documentation when voting for the first time may cast a provisional ballot.


33 If a voter must request a mail ballot, he or she can often provide a different mailing address for ballot delivery.

34 Jocelyn Grzeszczak, “These Are the States Where You Can Track Your Mail-In Vote,” Newsweek, August 18, 2020, at https://www.newsweek.com/these-are-states-where-you-can-track-your-mail-vote-1525920.
yet been cast by a voter who decides to vote in-person instead or if officials receive a mail ballot from a voter after he or she has voted in-person.\textsuperscript{35}

States employ a number of measures to verify that a mail ballot is completed by the intended voter.\textsuperscript{36} Many jurisdictions require voter signatures to accompany completed mail ballots. The voter’s signature often accompanies a legal attestation, asserting the voter’s identity and eligibility. Election officials, computer software, or both are used to match the signature(s) submitted by the voter to a known signature on file from the voter’s registration records or other government agency records, if applicable, via a process known as signature verification.\textsuperscript{37} If there is a missing, mismatched, or ambiguous signature, some states contact the voter and may provide an opportunity for the voter to correct the issue through processes known as signature curing, which may include an affidavit, a copy of additional identification, or both.\textsuperscript{38} States may also have requirements for witness signatures or notarization of mail ballots, and voters may need to submit a copy of their photo identification with a mail ballot in certain circumstances.\textsuperscript{39} Election officials may also check to ensure that the return address on a mail ballot matches that of the

\textsuperscript{35} See, for example, California Secretary of State, Voting at a Polling Place after Applying to Vote by Mail, at https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting-resources/voting-california/if-you-applied; and “Michigan’s Absentee Voting Process,” in Michigan Bureau of Elections, Election Officials’ Manual, November 2019, ch. 6, at http://www.michigan.gov/documents/sos/V1_Michigans_Absentee_Voting_Process_265992_7.pdf. Some jurisdictions may allow a voter who had previously requested a mail ballot to cast a regular in-person ballot. Other jurisdictions may require a voter who had previously requested a mail ballot to cast a provisional ballot in-person, to allow election administrators to confirm that the mail ballot has not been cast; a provisional ballot may be required, for example, if a voter cannot provide the blank mail ballot to officials at the polling site. For additional discussion, see, for example, Associated Press, “States Have Checks in Place to Prevent Voters From Voting Twice,” August 26, 2020, at https://apnews.com/article/9308770212, and Nick Corasaniti and Stephanie Saul, “Is Voting Twice a Felony?” The New York Times, September 9, 2020, at https://www.nytimes.com/article/voting-twice.html.

\textsuperscript{36} Some states may waive certain requirements to make accommodations for individuals with disabilities who need assistance completing their ballots on a case-by-case basis. For further discussion of these issues, see Maggie Astor, “What It’s Like to Vote With a Disability During a Pandemic,” The New York Times, September 25, 2020, at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/25/us/politics/voting-disability-virus.html.


voter.⁴⁰ Some states require that a voter return his or her own ballot or limit who, aside from the voter, can return an absentee ballot.⁴¹

**When do states count ballots and certify election results?**

The timeline for counting votes can vary, depending on when states and localities allow voters to cast their ballots⁴² and when election officials are allowed to begin processing and counting those ballots. The window available for voters to cast ballots varies by state, as jurisdictions have different polling place hours on election day, as well as different policies regarding the availability and duration of in-person early voting and mail voting.⁴³ In several states, mail ballots are sent, and early in-person voting may begin, at least 45 days ahead of election day.⁴⁴ Depending on state law, early voting might end several days before election day or continue until the day before election day. For mail ballots, states vary in whether the ballots must be received on election day or postmarked by election day.⁴⁵

In many states, election officials can begin “processing” absentee ballots they have received before election day, though what “processing” means varies by state. Processing often can involve scanning the tracking barcode on a return ballot envelope and signature verification, where the signature required on the outside of the ballot envelope is compared with a voter’s known signature from state registration records. Some states also allow early ballots to be counted before election day, whereas other states prohibit ballots from being counted before polls close on election day.⁴⁶ States also vary in how and when they count provisional ballots cast on

---


²⁷ The Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA; 52 U.S.C. §§20301-20311) specifies separate requirements for citizens abroad and members of the uniformed services (primarily military members). For brief additional discussion, see CRS In Focus IF11642, Absentee Voting for Uniformed Services and Overseas Citizens: Roles and Process, In Brief, by R. Sam Garrett.


election day. Some states begin counting provisional ballots immediately after polls close, with statutory deadlines ranging from two days to weeks after an election, whereas other states examine provisional ballots as part of the canvass process. Some states do not specify a deadline for their certified election results, and other states have deadlines ranging from November 5 to December 11 for the 2020 general election.

How might the COVID-19 pandemic affect vote count procedures and timing in 2020?

States’ actions to expand access to mail voting and voters’ concerns about the safety of in-person voting have prompted an increase in mail ballot requests in many states in 2020. Mail ballots require more processing than ballots cast in person and may arrive after the close of polls in jurisdictions that accept ballots postmarked by election day. Unfamiliarity with 2020 mail voting timeframes or procedures—due to general lack of experience with mail voting or changes in processes in response to the COVID-19 pandemic—could lead some voters to make mistakes when completing or submitting mail ballots. Delays, or concerns about delays, in postal service could prompt voters who have requested mail ballots to nevertheless go to the polls in person to vote.

Any or all of those factors could affect vote count procedures and timing in 2020. Voter errors on mail ballots could increase processing time in jurisdictions that offer voters opportunities to cure their ballots, for example, or prompt litigation that delays the release of official results.

---

47 Provisional ballot is a general term used to describe a ballot provided to a voter when there is uncertainty surrounding the voter’s eligibility, under circumstances described in HAVA or state law.


51 For more information about processing of mail ballots, see the “What processes help election officials determine voter eligibility and the validity of ballots cast?” section of this report.


54 Specific information about litigation is beyond the scope of this report. For more information about current COVID-19-related election litigation, see, for example, Stanford-MIT Healthy Elections Project, COVID-Related Election Litigation Tracker, https://healthyelections-case-tracker.stanford.edu/search.
Jurisdictions might require in-person voters to use a provisional ballot, which requires additional processing to confirm voter eligibility and prevent double voting, if they are on record as requesting a mail ballot.\textsuperscript{55} Depending on how jurisdictions choose to conduct their counts—whether they increase postelection staffing, for example, or extend the timeframe for processing mail ballots—such factors could lead to later release of official election results in some states in 2020 than in previous years.\textsuperscript{56}

The COVID-19 pandemic might also affect the 2020 vote count in other ways, in addition to direct and indirect effects of increased mail voting. Increased interest in and expanded access to in-person early voting could help offset effects like those described above, while other results of the pandemic might contribute to them. Health or economic effects of the pandemic could contribute to understaffing of election offices or ballot-processing teams, for example, and COVID-19-related closures or backlogs at offices that process voter registration information could contribute to an increase in provisional voting in some jurisdictions.\textsuperscript{57} New or ongoing lawsuits about aspects of the election other than mail voting could also affect the procedures election officials use to tally the 2020 vote and the timeline on which they finalize the count.\textsuperscript{58}

**How have states responded to potential effects of COVID-19 on the 2020 vote count?**

States have responded to some potential effects of the COVID-19 pandemic by trying to minimize or prevent delays in the count and release of official election results. Measures employed by some states include moving up the date when election workers can start processing mail ballots and hiring additional temporary staff to help with ballot processing.\textsuperscript{59} Election officials in many jurisdictions are working with local postmasters and United States Postal Service election mail coordinators to help identify ways to facilitate timely delivery of mail ballots, such as by creating color-coded mail ballot return envelopes and providing estimated


\textsuperscript{58} Specific information about litigation is beyond the scope of this report. For more information about current COVID-19-related election litigation, see, for example, Stanford-MIT Healthy Elections Project, COVID-Related Election Litigation Tracker, https://healthyelections-case-tracker.stanford.edu/search.

drop-off dates for election mail. Many election officials are also encouraging voters to cast their ballots early, where possible, by returning mail ballots promptly or taking advantage of in-person early voting periods.

In addition to trying to minimize or prevent delays in the release of official election results, many jurisdictions have taken steps to educate voters about the potential for and meaning of any delays that do occur. A concern some have raised about the 2020 elections is that delays in the release of official results might lead some to question the legitimacy of the election. Many states have responded to such concerns by sharing public information about typical postelection processes and timelines or adapting their plans for initial results reporting to more clearly convey the incompleteness of unofficial results. In one state, for example, the secretary of state announced that early reporting would include data on the number of requested mail ballots that had not yet been counted to provide a sense of the potential scope of outstanding ballots.

What processes are available if disputes remain after election results are certified?

Different terminology applies to various scenarios surrounding disputed election results. The term recount refers to retabulating ballots to ensure that the certified count was accurate (although, in some jurisdictions, recounts might occur before certification). Election officials generally conduct recounts when elections result in very close margins of victory to confirm that the certified results are accurate, or if there is evidence that counting equipment malfunctioned. There are two kinds of recounts: automatic and requested. Typically, a narrow margin of victory

---


in an individual race (e.g., less than one-half percent in some states) triggers an automatic recount as specified in state statutes. In other cases, candidates or voters may request recounts (sometimes called initiated recounts), often at their expense and under processes specified in state statutes. Relevant state, territorial, or local election statutes specify which recount options are available in particular jurisdictions, if any, and under what circumstances.

States or other election jurisdictions conduct recounts either by rescanning ballots or by hand counting, depending on circumstances and relevant requirements, and may address all or part of the certified results. Recounts also may involve a recanvass—in some states a separate process—to reexamine the validity of the ballots included in the certified results. Election officials, recount boards, or both typically conduct recounts.

Although timing varies by state, statutes typically limit the period during which recounts may occur. Election officials can face particularly tight deadlines for conducting recounts if they occur shortly before officeholders-elect are to be sworn in. In addition, for presidential elections, a federal “safe harbor” deadline may affect how long states have to conduct their recounts in presidential elections.

Election contests focus on the circumstances surrounding the conduct of the election. As with recounts, contests follow processes addressed in relevant state law. Generally, contests are resolved through litigation that is beyond the scope of this report. The Federal Contested Election Act (FCEA) provides procedures for resolving contested U.S. House elections. Ultimately, Article I, Section 5 of the U.S. Constitution specifies that each chamber of Congress “shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members.” Other CRS products provide information on related topics concerning contested U.S. House elections, the electoral college, and the congressional role in verifying and counting presidential election results.

66 For example, as the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) has explained, “although post-election audits can lead to a full recount if errors are detected, they differ from a recount in that they are conducted regardless of the margins of victory. Recounts are most often triggered or requested if there is a tight margin of victory.” See National Conference of State Legislatures, “Post-Election Audits,” October 25, 2019, https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/post-election-audits635926066.aspx.

67 For additional discussion, see CRS In Focus IF11641, The Electoral College: A 2020 Presidential Election Timeline, by Thomas H. Neale; and CRS Report R40504, Contingent Election of the President and Vice President by Congress: Perspectives and Contemporary Analysis, by Thomas H. Neale.


70 See, for example, CRS In Focus IF11641, The Electoral College: A 2020 Presidential Election Timeline, by Thomas H. Neale; CRS Report R43824, Electoral College Reform: Contemporary Issues for Congress, by Thomas H. Neale; and CRS Report R40504, Contingent Election of the President and Vice President by Congress: Perspectives and Contemporary Analysis, by Thomas H. Neale.

Author Information

Sarah J. Eckman
Analyst in American National Government

Karen L. Shanton
Analyst in American National Government

R. Sam Garrett
Specialist in American National Government

Disclaimer

This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.