Evolution of the Meaning of “Waters of the United States” in the Clean Water Act

Updated March 5, 2019
Summary

For more than forty-five years, all three branches of government have struggled with how to interpret the meaning of “waters of the United States” in the Clean Water Act. In a shift from early water pollution legislation, the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, which came to be known as the Clean Water Act, eliminated the requirement that federally regulated waters must be capable of being used by vessels in interstate commerce. Rather than use traditional navigability tests, the 1972 amendments redefined “navigable waters” for purposes of the Clean Water Act’s jurisdiction to include “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.” Disputes over the proper meaning of that phrase have been ongoing since that change.

Federal authority to regulate waters within the United States primarily derives from the Commerce Clause, and accordingly, federal laws and regulations concerning waters of the United States cannot cover matters which exceed that constitutional source of authority. During the first two decades after the passage of the Clean Water Act, courts generally interpreted the act as having a wide jurisdictional reach. In recent decades, however, the Supreme Court has emphasized that “the grant of authority to Congress under the Commerce Clause, though broad, is not unlimited.” This modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence has informed federal courts’ approach to interpreting which “waters” are subject to the Clean Water Act. At the same time, the Supreme Court has not always provided clear rules for determining whether a particular waterbody is a water of the United States. In its most recent case on the issue, *Rapanos v. United States*, the High Court issued a fractured 4-1-4 decision with no majority opinion providing a rationale for how to evaluate jurisdictional disputes.

Some courts and commentators disagree on how the scope of federal jurisdictional waters changed over time as a result of interpretative approaches taken by the agencies responsible for administering the Clean Water Act—the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps). This debate resurfaced during the Obama Administration when the Corps and EPA issued a rule, known as the Clean Water Rule, which substantially redefined “waters of the United States” in the agencies’ regulations for the first time in more than two decades. While some argued that the Clean Water Rule constituted a large-scale expansion of federal jurisdiction, others asserted that the agencies construed the term in a narrower fashion than in prior regulations.

A vocal critic of the Clean Water Rule, President Trump shifted the executive branch’s policy toward the meaning of “waters of the United States.” In February 2017, President Trump issued an executive order directing EPA and the Corps to review and revise or rescind the Clean Water Rule. The agencies currently are in the process of carrying out the executive order, and they unveiled proposed regulations redefining “waters of the United States” in December 2018. As in nearly all prior attempts to define this phrase, observers disagree on whether the latest proposed definition correctly calibrates the scope of federal jurisdiction to regulate water pollution.
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For more than forty-five years, all three branches of government have struggled with how to interpret the meaning of “waters of the United States” in the Clean Water Act. In 1972, Congress eliminated the requirement that waters must be navigable in the traditional sense—meaning they are capable of being used by vessels in interstate commerce—in order to be subject to federal water pollution regulation. Rather than use traditional tests of navigability, the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, which came to be known as the Clean Water Act, redefined “navigable waters” to include “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.” Disputes over the meaning of that phrase have been ongoing ever since the change.

Some courts and commentators disagree on how the scope of federal jurisdictional waters changed over time as a result of interpretative approaches taken by the agencies responsible for administering the Clean Water Act—the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps). This debate resurfaced during the Obama Administration.

1 In Riverside Bayview Homes v. United States, 474 U.S. 121, 132-33 (1985), the Supreme Court explained that, in the 1972 Clean Water Act amendments, “Congress evidently intended to repudiate limits that had been placed on federal regulation by earlier water pollution control statutes, and to exercise its powers under the Commerce Clause to regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed ‘navigable’ under the classical understanding of that term.” The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to “regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states . . . .” U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 3.

2 See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870) (construing the term “navigable waters,” as employed in federal statutes at issue, as covering those waters that are “used or are susceptible of being used in their ordinary condition as highways for commerce over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water”); The Montello, 87 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1874) (“If [the subject water] be capable in its natural state of being used for purposes of commerce, no matter in what mode the commerce may be conducted, it is navigable in fact, and becomes in law a public river or highway.”); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926) (“The rule long since approved by this court in applying the Constitution and laws of the United States is that streams or lakes which are navigable in fact must be regarded as navigable in law; that they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their natural and ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.”).

3 At common law, only waters subject to the ebb and flow of tide were held to be navigable waters subject to federal jurisdiction. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563; Nelson v. Leland, 63 U.S. 48, 55 (1860). This rule was largely due to the fact that, given the geography of England, there were few waters which were susceptible to use in commerce that were not also subject to the ebb and flow of tide. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563. Based on geographic differences and the recognition that “[s]ome of our [American] rivers are as navigable for many hundreds of miles above as they are below the limits of tide water,” American courts in the 19th century departed from the common law rule and began to analyze whether waters were “navigable-in-fact.” Id.; see also, e.g., Nelson, 63 U.S. at 55-56 (distinguishing between admiralty jurisdiction exercised in England and in the United States); Escanaba Cnty. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1883) (describing how the common law rule “has long since been discarded in this country”).


6 Compare, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 722 (2006) (plurality opinion) (Scalia, J.) (describing “the immense expansion of federal regulation of land use that has occurred under the Clean Water Act—without any change in the governing statute—during the past five Presidential administrations”) and Jamison E. Colburn, Waters of the United States, Theory, Practice, and Integrity at the Supreme Court, 34 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 183, 199 (2007) (explaining “how two relatively conservative administrative agencies gradually decided, in six different Presidential administrations, to expand federal jurisdiction as dramatically as they have”) with Jon Devine et al., The Historical Scope of Clean Water Act Jurisdiction, ENVTL. FORUM, July/August 2012, at 57, (attempting to “refute[] the contention that the Corps and EPA have steadily expanded their assertions of the [Clean Water] Act’s scope” and arguing “that the agencies have actually retreated from the jurisdictional scope initially intended and asserted for the CWA”) and Envil. Prot. Agency & Dep’t of the Army, Technical Support Document for the Clean Water Rule: Definition of Waters of the United States, 30-34 (May 27, 2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-05/documents/
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when the Corps and EPA issued a rule, known as the Clean Water Rule, which substantially redefined “waters of the United States” in the agencies’ regulations for the first time in more than two decades.\(^7\) While some argued that the Clean Water Rule constituted a major expansion of federal jurisdiction, others asserted that the agencies construed the term in a narrower fashion than in prior regulations.\(^8\)

A vocal critic of the Clean Water Rule, President Trump shifted the executive branch’s policy toward the meaning of “waters of the United States.”\(^9\) In February 2017, President Trump issued an executive order directing EPA and the Corps to review and revise or rescind the Clean Water Rule.\(^10\) The agencies currently are in the process of carrying out the executive order, and they unveiled proposed regulations redefining “waters of the United States” in December 2018.\(^11\) As in nearly all prior attempts to define this phrase, however, observers disagree on whether the latest proposed definition correctly calibrates the scope of federal water pollution regulation.\(^12\) This report provides context for this debate by examining the history of major changes to the meaning of “waters of the United States” as expressed in federal regulations, legislation, agency guidance, and case law.\(^13\)

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\(^7\) See infra § “The Clean Water Rule.”

\(^8\) Compare, e.g., Jenny Hopkinson, Obama’s Water War, POLITICO (May 27, 2015), https://www.politico.com/story/2015/05/epa-waterways-wetlands-rule-118319 (“[O]pponents condemn [the Clean Water Rule] as a massive power grab by Washington, saying it will give bureaucrats carte blanche to swoop in and penalize landowners every time a cow walks through a ditch.”) with Technical Support for Clean Water Rule, supra note 6, at 30 (arguing that the Clean Water Rule narrowed federal jurisdiction when compared to prior regulations).

\(^9\) See infra § “The Trump Administration and “Waters of the United States”


\(^11\) See infra § “The Two-Step Rescind and Revise Process.”

\(^12\) See infra § “The Legal Landscape for the 116th Congress.”

\(^13\) While this report outlines many notable changes to the definition of “waters of the United States,” it does not address every agency interpretation or application of that phrase. For example, the report does not address most property-specific applications of the definition of “waters of the United States,” such as those made in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit (NPDES) decisions, e.g., Envtl. Prot. Agency, Off. of Gen. Counsel, Opinion No. 21, In re Riverside Irrigation District, LTD and 17 Others (June 27, 1975), 1975 WL 23864, at *1-5 (interpreting the Clean Water Act and EPA’s definition of “waters of the United States” in its regulations to determine whether an NPDES permit may be required for irrigation return flow canals and irrigation and drainage ditches); Section 404 Dredge and Fill Permit Decisions, ORM Jurisdictional Determinations and Permit Decisions, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, http://corpsmapu.usace.army.mil/cm_apex/f?p=340:2:0::NO (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (database of Section 404 permit decisions), or jurisdictional determinations, ORM Jurisdictional Determinations and Permit Decisions, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, http://corpsmapu.usace.army.mil/cm_apex/f?p=340:11:0::NO (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (database of jurisdictional determinations); U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., Inc., 578 U.S. ___ , 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016) (providing background on the process of providing jurisdictional determinations as to whether a specific parcel is subject to Section 404’s dredge and fill permit requirements). This report also does not address minor changes among EPA’s various regulatory definitions which do not reflect a change in the agency’s overall interpretation of the scope of waters of the United States. See, e.g., Envtl. Prot. Agency, Off. of Gen. Counsel, Opinion No. 77-3, Clarification of the Term “Navigable Waters” as it is Presently Used in FWPCA Regulations and Guidelines (February 28, 1977), 1977 WL 28236 (discussing differences among EPA’s definitions and proposals to streamline the definition).
Background

The Clean Water Act is the principal law governing pollution of the nation’s surface waters.\footnote{See Joël M. Gross, Kerri L. Stelcen, 
Clean Water Act: Basic Practice Series (2d ed. 2012); CRS Report RL30030, Clean Water Act: A Summary of the Law, by Laura Gatz, at 1.} Among other requirements, the act prohibits the unauthorized discharge of pollutants into “navigable waters,” \footnote{33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).} and requires persons wishing to discharge dredged or fill material into “navigable waters” to obtain a permit from the Corps.\footnote{Id. § 1344.} In its definition section, the act defines the term “navigable waters” to mean “waters of the United States, including its territorial seas.”\footnote{Id. § 1362(7).} This single, jurisdiction-defining phrase applies to the entire law, including the national pollutant discharge elimination system (NPDES) permit program;\footnote{Id. § 1342.} permit requirements for disposal of dredged or fill material, known as the Section 404 program;\footnote{Id. § 1344.} oil spill liability and prevention;\footnote{Id. § 1313.} water quality standards and measures to attain them;\footnote{Id. § 1321.} and enforcement.\footnote{Id. § 1319.}

**Key Terminology**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>Navigable-in-fact waters</td>
<td>A term of art developed by courts to describe waters that are navigable in the traditional sense, meaning they are capable of being used by vessels in interstate commerce or are subject to the ebb and flow of tide.\footnote{See, e.g., PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 591-92 (2012) (quoting The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1871)).}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interstate waters</td>
<td>Waters that form a part of a state’s boundary.\footnote{See Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, P.L. 845, 62 Stat. 1155, 1161.}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigable waters</td>
<td>An anomalous term as used in the Clean Water Act. The Clean Water Act governs “navigable waters,”\footnote{33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).} but this phrase is defined within the statute such that it is not limited to waters that are navigable-in-fact.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waters of the United States</td>
<td>The jurisdiction-defining phrase in the Clean Water Act. That statute generally regulates “navigable waters,” but it defines that term to mean “the Waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”\footnote{Id.}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jurisdictional waters</td>
<td>A term of art used by courts to describe those waters subject to federal regulatory jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act.\footnote{See, e.g., U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., Inc., 578 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1814 (2016).}</td>
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The Clean Water Act itself does not expand further on the meaning of “waters of the United States.” Instead, the Corps and EPA have expounded on this phrase through agency guidance and regulations, which federal courts have struck down on various occasions as failing to satisfy statutory or constitutional requirements.
Federal authority to regulate waters within the United States primarily derives from the Commerce Clause, which gives Congress the power to “regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states . . .” Accordingly, federal laws and regulations regulating waters of the United States cannot cover matters that exceed that constitutional source of authority. Legal challenges to the Corps’ and EPA’s interpretation of “waters of the United States”—particularly those which were successful—often followed broader trends in interpreting the Commerce Clause. For a period after its enactment in 1972, courts generally interpreted the Clean Water Act as having a wide jurisdictional reach, but, in recent decades, the Supreme Court has emphasized that “the grant of authority to Congress under the Commerce Clause, though broad, is not unlimited.”

A time line of events in the evolution of the definition of “waters of the United States” is provided in the Appendix, and major events are shown in Figure 1.

**Figure 1. Major Events in the Evolution of “Waters of the United States”**

Source: Congressional Research Service, based on the sources cited in this report.

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28 See Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. 713, 724-725 (1866) (“The power to regulate commerce comprehends the control for that purpose, and to the extent necessary, of all the navigable waters of the United States which are accessible from a State other than those in which they lie.”). See also United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 133 (1985) (discussing Congress’s invocation of the Commerce Clause powers in enacting the Clean Water Act).

29 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.


31 See infra § “Judicially Imposed Limitations Beginning in the Late 1990s.”

Early History of Jurisdictional Waters

Historically, federal laws regulating waterways, such as the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899 (Rivers and Harbors Act), exercised jurisdiction over “navigable water[s] of the United States[.]” The Supreme Court interpreted this phrase to govern only waters that were “navigable-in-fact”—meaning that they were “used, or are susceptible of being used, . . . as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.”

Beginning with the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Congress began to use a different jurisdiction-defining phrase to regulate pollution of “interstate waters,” which it defined as “all rivers, lakes, and other waters that flow across, or form a part of, a State’s boundaries.” Congress amended that legislation in 1961 to expand federal jurisdiction from “interstate waters” to “interstate or navigable waters[.]”

The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, which came to be known as the Clean Water Act, again amended the jurisdictional reach of federal water pollution legislation. There, Congress exercised jurisdiction over “navigable waters,” but provided a new definition of that phrase, stating: “The term ‘navigable waters’ means the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.” This subtle definitional change proved to have tremendous consequences for the jurisdictional scope of the Clean Water Act.

In debating the 1972 amendments that created the Clean Water Act, some Members of Congress explained that they intended the revised definition to expand the law’s jurisdiction beyond traditionally navigable or interstate waters. The conference report states that the “conferees fully intend that the term ‘navigable waters’ be given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation unencumbered by agency determinations which have been made or may be made for administrative purposes.” And during debate in the House on approving the conference report, one Representative explained that the definition “clearly encompasses all water bodies, including streams and their tributaries, for water quality purposes.” Courts have frequently referred to the

33 See Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, 30 Stat. 1121, 1151 (codified in 33 U.S.C. § 401) (“It shall not be lawful to construct or commence the construction of any bridge, causeway, dam, or dike over or in any ... navigable water of the United States until the consent of Congress shall have been obtained . . . .”); An Act to Provide Security for the Lives of Passengers on Board of Vessels Propelled by Steam, 5 Stat. 304 (1838) (providing that “it shall not be lawful for the owner . . . of any steamboat . . . to transport any goods, wares, merchandise or passengers, in or upon ... navigable waters of the United States . . . without having first obtained . . . a license”).

34 See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1870). Waters, the Court explained in The Daniel Ball, “constitute navigable waters of the United States within the meaning of the acts of Congress, in contradistinction from the navigable waters of the States, when they form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a contained [sic] highway over which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign countries in the customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by water.”

35 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, P.L. 845, § 10(e), 62 Stat. 1155, 1161.


39 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, P.L. 92-500, § 502(7), 86 Stat. 816, 886 (codified in § 1362(7)).

40 S. Rept. No. 92-1236, at 144 (1972) (Conf. Rep.).

act’s legislative history when interpreting its jurisdictional reach, but they have not always agreed on the import of this history.43

Differing Agency Definitions Following the Clean Water Act

The Corps and EPA share responsibility for administering the Clean Water Act. Both agencies have administrative responsibilities under Section 404 of the act, and EPA administers most other Clean Water Act-related programs in partnership with U.S. states. Because of this shared jurisdiction, both agencies create regulations defining the waters subject to their regulatory jurisdiction. In the initial years following the enactment of the Clean Water Act, their respective definitions differed significantly.46

EPA’s Initial Definitions

In May 1973, EPA issued its first set of regulations implementing the Clean Water Act’s NPDES permit program. There, EPA defined the term “navigable waters” to include six categories of waterbodies.49


45 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (stating that EPA will implement the Clean Water Act unless expressly stated otherwise); Benjamin R. Civiletti, Administrative Authority to Construe § 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 197, 197 (1979) (“Congress intended to confer upon the administrator of the [EPA] the final administrative authority to determine . . . the reach of the term ‘navigable waters’ . . .”).

46 See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3 (2016) (containing the Corps’ definition of “waters of the United States”); 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2016) (including one EPA definition of “waters of the United States”).


49 Id.
EPA's First Definition of Jurisdictional Waters

In May 1973, EPA issued regulations defining jurisdictional waters for purposes of the NPDES permit program as the following:

1. All navigable waters of the United States;
2. Tributaries of navigable waters of the United States;
3. Interstate waters;
4. Intrastate lakes, rivers, and streams which are utilized by interstate travelers for recreational or other purposes;
5. Intrastate lakes, rivers, and streams from which fish or shellfish are taken and sold in interstate commerce; and
6. Intrastate lakes, rivers, and streams which are utilized for industrial purposes by industries in interstate commerce.

Three months prior to issuing these regulations, EPA’s general counsel had provided an opinion on the meaning of “navigable waters” in the Clean Water Act. The general counsel’s recommended definition largely mirrored EPA’s 1973 regulatory definition, but with one critical difference: categories four through six of the general counsel’s recommendation would have included interstate lakes, rivers, and streams that are utilized for interstate activities rather than intrastate waters used for such activities. EPA’s definition of “navigable waters” in its non-NPDES water pollution regulations at the time also differed in certain ways from its May 1973 definition.

The Corps’ Initial Definition

The Corps’ early implementation of the Clean Water Act differed considerably from EPA’s regulations. After initially proposing regulations that simply repeated the statutory definition of “navigable waters,” the Corps issued final regulations in April 1974 implementing Section 404 of the Clean Water Act. There, the Corps acknowledged the language from the conference report for the Clean Water Act as calling for the “broadest possible constitutional interpretation” of...
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Navigable waters, but concluded that the Constitution limited its jurisdiction to the same waters that it regulated under preexisting laws, such as the Rivers and Harbors Act. Based on this reasoning, the Corps defined "navigable waters" using language that generally limited its jurisdiction to waters that were navigable-in-fact.

### The Corps' First Definition of Jurisdictional Waters

In its first set of final regulations, issued in 1974, implementing Section 404, the Corps equated the "navigable waters" regulated under the Clean Water Act with traditionally navigable waterways regulated under preexisting federal laws like the Rivers and Harbors Act:

> The term "navigable waters of the United States" and "navigable waters," as used herein mean those waters of the United States which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, and/or are presently, or have been in the past, or may be in the future susceptible for use for purposes of interstate or foreign commerce...\(^59\)

### Callaway and its Aftermath

Less than one year after the Corps published its first regulations defining jurisdictional waters, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia struck them down as too narrow and inconsistent with the Clean Water Act. In *Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway*, the court held that because "Congress...asserted federal jurisdiction over the nation’s waters to the maximum extent permissible under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution[,]" the definition could not be limited to "traditional tests of navigability[.]" The court ordered the Corps to produce new regulations that acknowledged "the full regulatory mandate" of the Clean Water Act.

### The Corps' Expansion of Jurisdictional Waters Following Callaway

The Corps responded to *Callaway* on May 6, 1975, by publishing proposed regulations that offered four alternative methods of redefining the Corps’ jurisdiction under the 1972 amendments.

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57 See id. at 12,115.
58 See 33 C.F.R. § 209.12(d)(1) (1974); see also 33 C.F.R. § 209.260(e)(1) (1974) ("[I] is the water body’s capability of use by the public for purposes of transportation or commerce which is the determinative factor.").
61 See Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685. Courts prior to *Callaway* also concluded that regulatory jurisdiction under the 1972 Amendments extended to waters that were not navigable-in-fact. See, e.g., United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1129-30 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding that Congress intended to control discharge of pollutants into nonnavigable tributaries which flowed into navigable waters, and that this exercise of authority was constitutional); United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 673 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (holding that Congress intended to address “the pollution of non-navigable mosquito canals and mangrove wetland areas”).
The Corps’ Four Proposed Alternatives Following Callaway
Following Callaway, the Corps published four proposed alternative scenarios in which it would evaluate Section 404 permits:

**Alternative 1:** Extend the Corps’ jurisdiction to “virtually every coastal and inland artificial or natural waterbody[,]” and apply the Corps’ permitting process to “all disposal of dredged or fill material in virtually every wetland contiguous to coastal waters, rivers, estuaries, lakes, streams and artificial waters . . . .”

**Alternative 2:** Limit jurisdiction to waters subject to the ebb and flow of tide and navigable-in-fact inland waters and their primary tributaries.

**Alternative 3:** Apply the jurisdictional authority in Alternative 1, but utilize only the Corps’ standard permitting process for navigable-in-fact waters. For waters that are not navigable-in-fact, the Corps would approve permits unless the state objects.

**Alternative 4:** Apply the limited jurisdiction in Alternative 2 and the limited permitting process of Alternative 3. The Corps stated that Alternative 4 was its preferred approach.

At the same time that it proposed these alternatives, the Corps published a press release stating that the holding of Callaway may require “the rancher who wants to enlarge his stock pond, or the farmer who wants to deepen an irrigation ditch or plow a field, or the mountaineer who wants to protect his land against stream erosion” to obtain federal permits. These events brought public and media attention to the breadth of jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act. They also created a disagreement between the Corps and EPA, and led to a series of subcommittee hearings in the House and Senate.

In the aftermath of this public and congressional scrutiny, the Corps issued interim final regulations in 1975 in which it revised the definition of “navigable waters” for purposes of the Clean Water Act’s Section 404 program by adopting much of the structure used in EPA’s 1973

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64 In its early regulations implementing the Clean Water Act, the Corps did not use the phrase “navigable-in-fact,” and instead used the phrase “navigable waters of the United States,” which was derived from prior laws such as the Rivers and Harbors Act. See id. Because of the similarity of language, and to provide clarity, this report uses the phrase “navigable-in-fact” to refer to traditionally navigable waters.

65 See id.


67 See, e.g., Army Engineers Seek Control of All Waters, Down to Ponds, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1975, at 12, PROQUEST; Wetlands and the Corps of Engineers, WASH. POST, June 3, 1975, at A18, PROQUEST. The Corps received over 4,500 comments on its proposed regulations, including comments from a “large number of Governors; members of Congress; Federal, State, and local agencies;” interest groups and members of the public. See Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320 (July 25, 1975).

68 EPA responded to the press released by accusing the Corps of misleading the public. Letter from Russell E. Train, EPA Admin., to Lt. Gen. William C. Gribble, Jr., Chief of Eng’rs, U.S. Army Corps. of Eng’rs (May 16, 1975), reprinted in Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 94th Cong., 528-29 (1976) (stating that the public confusion and misunderstanding “is directly attributable to the seriously inaccurate and misleading press release issued by the Corps”).

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regulations. The Corps’ definition also added “wetlands, mudflats, swamps, marshes, and shallows” that are “contiguous or adjacent to other navigable waters” and “artificially created channels and canals used for recreational or other navigational purposes that are connected to other navigable waters” to the definition of “waters of the United States.” Finally, the Corps’ 1975 interim regulations permitted federal regulation over all other waters that a Corps’ district engineer “determines necessitate regulation for the protection of water quality” based on the Corps’ technical standards and evaluation criteria.

The Corps’ 1977 Regulations

In 1977, the Corps issued final regulations reorganizing the definition of “waters of the United States” into five categories.

The Corps’ 1977 Definition and Its Commerce Clause-Focused Provision

The Corps reorganized the definition of “waters of the United States” in 1977, with Category 5 waters containing its broadest definition of jurisdictional waters as of that date:

1. The territorial seas with respect to the discharge of fill material...
2. Coastal and inland waters, lakes, rivers, and streams that are [navigable-in-fact], including adjacent wetlands;
3. Tributaries to navigable waters of the United States ...
4. Interstate waters and their tributaries, including adjacent wetlands; and
5. All other waters of the United States not identified in Categories 1-3, such as isolated lakes and wetlands, intermittent streams, prairie potholes, and other waters ... the destruction of which could affect interstate commerce.

The final category of the 1977 definition contained the Corps’ most expansive definition of jurisdictional waters as of that time. A footnote to the Corps’ regulations explained that the Category Five waters incorporate “all other waters of the United States that could be regulated

71 See 1975 Interim Final Rule, 40 Fed. Reg. at 31,324. The 1975 Interim Final Rule used a phased approach in which the Corps expanded its authority in three phases to be completed by 1977. See id. at 31,325-26. Phase I, which was immediately effective, included coastal waters and inland navigable-in-fact waters and their adjacent wetlands. See id. at 31,321-26. Phase II, which took effect on July 1, 1976, extended to lakes and primary tributaries of Phase I waters, as well as wetlands adjacent to the lakes and primary tributaries. Id. Phase III, which took effect on July 1, 1977, extended to all remaining areas encompassed by the regulations. Id. at 31,325.
72 Id. at 31,325. The criteria on which the district engineer was to base the necessity determination were set forth in 40 C.F.R. part 230 (1976).
73 See Final Rule, Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122 (July 19, 1977) [hereinafter 1977 Corps Rule]. Rather than continue to adjust the meaning of “navigable waters,” the Corps expanded upon the meaning of the phrase “waters of the United States” as its method of defining its regulatory jurisdiction in the 1977 Corps Rule. See id. at 37,127 (“Many suggested that we change our nomenclature of the term ‘navigable waters’ and refer to our jurisdiction under Section 404 [of the Clean Water Act] as ‘waters of the United States.’ . . . We have adopted this suggestion and feel that it will assist in distinguishing between the Section 404 program and the types of waters that are subject to the permit programs administered under the [Rivers and Harbors Act].”).
74 33 C.F.R. §323.2(a) (1978).
under the federal government’s Constitutional powers to regulate and protect interstate commerce.”\textsuperscript{75} The Corps would continue to use this Commerce Clause-focused provision (with revisions) until the Clean Water Rule was published in 2015,\textsuperscript{76} and EPA would later adopt it in its regulations.\textsuperscript{77}

The Clean Water Act of 1977

After the Corps’ 1975 and 1977 regulations, some Members of Congress introduced bills that sought to limit the Clean Water Act’s jurisdiction to traditional, navigable-in-fact waters,\textsuperscript{78} but the proposed limiting legislation never became law. Instead, Congress amended the Federal Water Pollution Control Act through the Clean Water Act of 1977, which did not alter the jurisdictional phrase “waters of the United States.”\textsuperscript{79}

The original version of the Clean Water Act of 1977 introduced in the House would have limited the Corps’ jurisdiction,\textsuperscript{80} and an amendment proposed in the Senate sought similar limitations.\textsuperscript{81} But the original Senate version, which generally retained the existing definition of “navigable waters,” was adopted in conference and passed into law.\textsuperscript{82} The Clean Water Act of 1977, as enacted, contained certain exemptions from Section 404 permitting for “normal farming, silviculture, . . . ranching[,]” and other activities.\textsuperscript{83}

Synthesizing Definitions Following the Clean Water Act of 1977

While the 1977 legislation appeared to resolve temporarily some congressional dispute over the reach of the Clean Water Act, disagreement arose between the Corps and EPA over which agency had final authority to determine which waters were subject to Section 404 permit requirements.\textsuperscript{84} EPA independently defined the jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water Act as it related to programs like NPDES and oil pollution prevention,\textsuperscript{85} but it incorporated the Corps’ definition into

\textsuperscript{75} See 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(a)(5) n.2 (1978).
\textsuperscript{76} See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2014) (defining “waters of the United States” in 2014, pre-Clean Water Rule regulations to include, among other things, “[a]ll other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce”).
\textsuperscript{77} See 40 C.F.R. § 122.3 (1981).
\textsuperscript{78} See e.g. S. 867, 95th Cong. (1977) (amending the definition of “navigable waters” to exclude water wholly contained on private property, under the jurisdiction of a state and local government, or which is not susceptible to use as a means to transport commerce); H.R. 3199, 95th Cong. (1977) (redefining “navigable waters” as navigable-in-fact waters and adjacent wetlands).
\textsuperscript{80} See H.R. 3199, 95th Cong. § 16 (1977) (as introduced) (proposing to redefine “navigable waters” as used in Section 404 to “mean all waters which are presently used, or are susceptible to use in their natural condition or by reasonable improvement as a means to transport interstate or foreign commerce shoreward to their ordinary high water mark, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide”).
\textsuperscript{81} See 123 CONG. REC. 26,710-11 (1977) (proposed amendment by Sen. Bentsen).
\textsuperscript{82} See 123 CONG. REC. 39,187 (1977) (statement of Sen. Muskie) (“The conference bill follows the Senate bill by maintaining the full scope of Federal regulatory authority over all discharges of dredged or fill material into any of the Nation’s waters.”).
\textsuperscript{83} See P.L. 95-217, § 67, 91 Stat. at 1600 (codified in 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)).
\textsuperscript{85} See supra note 53.
its regulations related to Section 404 permits.86 At the same time, however, EPA separately expanded on that definition in an appendix to its Section 404 regulations.87

The U.S. Attorney General ultimately intervened in 1979 and provided a legal opinion that EPA has final administrative authority to determine the reach of the term “navigable waters” for purposes of Section 404.88 The Corps and EPA eventually executed a Memorandum of Agreement in 1989 resolving that EPA would act as the lead agency responsible for developing programmatic guidance and interpretation of the scope of jurisdictional waters, and the Corps would be responsible for most case-specific determinations on whether certain property was subject to Section 404.89

Although it took the agencies 10 years after the Attorney General’s opinion to agree formally on a division of responsibilities,90 the Corps and EPA streamlined and harmonized the regulatory definition of “waters of the United States” well before that. In May 1980, EPA issued regulations redefining the term among its consolidated permit requirements,91 and the Corps adopted EPA’s definition in interim regulations two years later.92 The Corps issued final regulations in 1986 that did not change the regulatory definition,93 and the two agencies continued to use this core definition (with modifications) until they published the Clean Water Rule in 2015.94

86 See Navigable Waters, Discharge of Dredged or Fill Material, 40 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,293 (September 5, 1975) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 230.2(b) (1976)).

87 See id. at 41,297 app. A.


90 For background on the interagency dispute over the administration of Section 404, see Blumm & Mering, supra note 84.


94 Compare 40 C.F.R. § 122.3 (1981) (EPA’s definition) and 33 CFR § 323.3 (1987) (Corps’ final unified definition) with Technical Support for the Clean Water Rule, supra note 6, at 18 n.1 (EPA’s standard definition immediately prior to the issuance of the Clean Water Rule) and 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2014) (the Corps’ definition prior to the Clean Water Rule).
Evolution of the Meaning of “Waters of the United States” in the Clean Water Act

The Unified Definition of “Waters of the United States”

By 1982, both the Corps and EPA used the following definition of “waters of the United States” in their regulations:

(a) All waters which are currently used, were used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of tide;

(b) All interstate waters, including interstate “wetlands”;95

(c) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, “wetlands,” playa lakes, or natural ponds the use, degradation, or destruction of which would affect or could affect interstate or foreign commerce including any such waters:

(1) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign travelers for recreational or other purposes;

(2) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken and sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or

(3) Which are used or could be used for industrial purposes by industries in interstate commerce;

(d) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of the United States under this definition;

(e) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (1)-(4) of this definition;

(f) The territorial seas; and

(g) “Wetlands” adjacent to waters (other than waters that are themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a)-(f) of this definition.96

Changes in “Waters of the United States” in the 1980s

Riverside Bayview Homes

The Supreme Court reviewed a legal challenge to the Corps’ application of “waters of the United States” for the first time in 1985 in United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.97 There, the Corps sought to enjoin a property owner from discharging fill material on his wetlands located one mile from the shore of Lake St. Clair in Michigan,98 a 468-square-mile, navigable-in-fact lake that forms part of the boundary between Michigan and Ontario, Canada.99 The Corps argued that, by defining “waters of the United States” to include wetlands that are “adjacent to” other

95 “Wetlands” were defined as “those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that do support a prevalence of vegetation . . . . Wetlands generally include swamps, marshes, bogs, and similar areas.” See Final Rule, Consolidated Permit Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. at 33,424.


98 See id. at 124–25; see also United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 729 F.2d 391, 392 (6th Cir. 1984) (describing the wetland property at issue).

jurisdictional waters, including navigable-in-fact waters like Lake St. Clair, its regulations required the landowner to obtain a Section 404 permit before discharging fill material.\textsuperscript{100}

Before the case reached the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit concluded that it must construe the Corps’ regulatory definition narrowly in order to avoid a potential violation of the Fifth Amendment prohibition on the taking of private property for public use without just compensation.\textsuperscript{101} Applying this method of interpretation, the Sixth Circuit construed the Corps’ regulations so as not to include the wetlands at issue, and it avoided reaching a decision on whether the Corps’ regulations were constitutional.\textsuperscript{102}

The Supreme Court reversed.\textsuperscript{103} Although it acknowledged that on a “purely linguistic level” it may seem unreasonable to classify \textit{lands}, wet or otherwise, as \textit{waters}, the Supreme Court called such a plain language approach “simplistic.”\textsuperscript{104} Further, it rejected the lower courts’ concerns over the constitutionality of the Corps’ regulations as “spurious.”\textsuperscript{105} Instead of applying a narrow approach to avoid constitutional implications, the Court gave deference to the Corps’ position, and concluded that because “[w]ater moves in hydrological cycles” rather than along “artificial lines,” it was reasonable for the Corps to conclude that “adjacent wetlands are inseparably bound up with the ‘waters’ of the United States . . . .”\textsuperscript{106}

The Court also cited legislative history from the passage of the Clean Water Act and the amendments in 1977—in which the term “adjacent wetlands” was added to the statute\textsuperscript{107}—as support for its conclusion that Congress intended for the Clean Water Act to have a broad jurisdictional reach which included the adjacent wetlands at issue.\textsuperscript{108} In concluding that adjacent wetlands could reasonably be covered, however, the Court also emphasized that it did not express any opinion on the Corps’ authority to regulate discharges of fill material into wetlands that are not adjacent to bodies of open water.\textsuperscript{109}

The Migratory Bird Rule and Other Adjustments to “Waters of the United States”

Following \textit{Riverside Bayview Homes}, the Corps and EPA engaged in rulemaking in which they interpreted the Clean Water Act to govern all waters which were used or may have been used by

\textsuperscript{100} See \textit{Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.}, 474 U.S. at 124-25.

\textsuperscript{101} See \textit{Riverside Bayview Homes}, 729 F.2d at 397-98. \textit{See also} U.S. CONST. amend. V (“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation”).

\textsuperscript{102} \textit{Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.}, 474 U.S. at 139.

\textsuperscript{103} \textit{Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.}, 474 U.S. at 132.

\textsuperscript{104} \textit{Id.} at 132. This comment appears to be in response to the Sixth Circuit’s statement that “[t]he language of the [Clean Water Act] makes no reference to ‘lands’ or wetlands’ or flooded areas at all.” \textit{Riverside Bayview Homes}, 729 F.2d at 397.

\textsuperscript{105} \textit{See Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.}, 474 U.S. at 129.

\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Id.} at 133-34.


\textsuperscript{108} \textit{See Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.}, 474 U.S. at 132-34. In a later decision, \textit{Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers}, the Supreme Court stated that its decision in \textit{Riverside Bayview Homes} “was based in large measure upon Congress’ unequivocal acquiescence to, and approval of, the Corps’ regulations interpreting the CWA to cover wetlands adjacent to navigable waters.” 531 U.S. 159, 180-81 (2001); \textit{see also infra “SWANCC.”}

\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.}, 474 U.S. at 131 n.8.
migratory birds crossing state lines.\textsuperscript{110} The agencies did not redefine “waters of the United States” through this interpretation, which came to be known as the Migratory Bird Rule, but instead stated that the Migratory Bird Rule was a “clarification” of the existing regulatory definition.\textsuperscript{111}

The agencies also continued to adjust their interpretation of the definition of “waters of the United States” in the late 1980s by, among other things, excluding nontidal drainage and irrigation ditches, artificial lakes or ponds used for irrigation and stock watering, reflecting pools, and swimming pools.\textsuperscript{112} In 1993, the agencies jointly revised their regulations to exclude “prior converted cropland”—areas that were previously drained and converted to agricultural use—from jurisdictional waters.\textsuperscript{113}

\textbf{Competing Wetland Manuals and Congressional Intervention Through Appropriations}

In addition to disputes over the textual definition of “waters of the United States,” disagreement surrounding the technical standards used to delineate the physical boundaries of jurisdictional waters, particularly wetlands, arose in the late 1980s.\textsuperscript{114} The Corps issued the first wetlands delineation manual in 1987 (1987 Manual),\textsuperscript{115} but EPA published its own manual the following year which used an alternative technical analysis.\textsuperscript{116} Differences among these and other wetlands manuals led to the preparation of an interagency Federal Manual for Identifying and Delineating Jurisdictional Wetlands in January 1989 (Federal Manual).\textsuperscript{117}

Some observers criticized aspects of the Federal Manual, including the methodology it employed for identifying and delineating jurisdictional waters.\textsuperscript{118} Some also argued that the Federal Manual


\textsuperscript{113}See Clean Water Act Regulatory Programs; Final Rule, 58 Fed. Reg. 45,008, 45,031, 45,036-37 (Aug. 25, 1993). Requirements and methods for delineation of prior converted cropland are outside the scope of this report.


\textsuperscript{116}See HEMLIC ET AL., supra note 114, at 12 (outlining history of wetlands delineation manuals); see also \textit{JAMES S. WAKELEY, DEVELOPING A “REGIONALIZED” VERSION OF THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS WETLANDS DELINEATION MANUAL: ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS, ERC/CEL TR-02-20, 2 (2001) (describing differences in manuals).}


improperly expanded the scope of federal regulations of wetlands. Disagreements ultimately led to congressional action in 1991 in the form of appropriations legislation that prohibited the Corps from using funds to identify jurisdictional waters using the Federal Manual. The following year, Congress mandated that the Corps use the 1987 Manual until a new manual was published after public notice and comment. The interagency group proposed revisions to the Federal Manual, which received over 100,000 comments, but that proposal was never finalized, and no interagency wetlands manual was created.

Judicially Imposed Limitations Beginning in the Late 1990s

In contrast to the agencies’ attempt to align jurisdictional waters with what they interpreted to be the outer reaches of the Commerce Clause in the 1980s, a series of court cases beginning in the late 1990s caused the Corps and EPA to modify their interpretation of “waters of the United States.” For much of the 20th century, the Supreme Court broadly construed the Commerce Clause to give Congress discretion to regulate activities which “affect” interstate commerce, so long as its legislation was reasonably related to achieving its goals of regulating interstate commerce. In the 1995 case of United States v. Lopez, however, the Supreme Court struck

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119 See Heimliek et al., supra note 114, at 12; see also Wakeley, supra note 116, at 3 ("[T]he 1989 Federal manual generated almost immediate opposition from groups that believed that the manual expanded the federal government’s regulatory authority into lands previously considered to be non-jurisdictional.").


123 See Heimliek et al., supra note 114, at 12. EPA and other agencies have continued to publish wetland guidance documents. See, e.g., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR CONSTRUCTED TREATMENT WETLANDS: PROVIDING FOR WATER QUALITY AND WILDLIFE HABITAT (2000). Because wetland delineation on agricultural properties implicates the Food Security Act and the jurisdiction of Natural Resources Conversation Service within the Department of Agriculture, a separate wetlands delineation manual is used for agricultural lands. See Wakeley, supra note 116, at 3.

124 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941) (“The power of Congress over interstate commerce . . . extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce . . . to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end[,]”); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) (upholding regulations on price of wheat and stating that even if the regulated “activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce”); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964) (“How obstructions in commerce may be removed—what means are to be employed—is within the sound and exclusive discretion of the Congress. It is subject only to one caveat—that the means chosen by it must be reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution.”); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (holding that a criminal prohibition on “loansharking” sufficiently affected interstate commerce to withstand a Commerce Clause challenge).
down a federal statute for the first time in more than 50 years based purely on a finding that Congress exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause.\(^{125}\)

In *Lopez*, the Court held the Commerce Clause did not provide a constitutional basis for federal legislation criminalizing possession of a firearm in a school zone because the law neither regulated a commercial activity nor contained a requirement that the firearm possession be connected to interstate commerce.\(^{126}\) The Court revisited its prior Commerce Clause cases and sorted Congress’s commerce power into three categories: (1) regulation of channels of commerce, (2) regulation of instrumentalities of commerce, and (3) regulation of economic activities which not only affect but “substantially affect” interstate commerce.\(^{127}\) *Lopez* set the backdrop for a series of major opinions limiting federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act.

**United States v. Wilson**

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued the first in the series of decisions limiting the jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water Act in 1997.\(^{128}\) Following a seven-week trial in *United States v. Wilson*, a jury convicted three defendants of violating Section 404\(^{129}\) for knowingly discharging fill material into wetland property located approximately 10 miles from the Chesapeake Bay and 6 miles from the Potomac River in Maryland.\(^{130}\) On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the defendants challenged their conviction on the ground that the portion of the Corps’ regulatory definition of “waters of the United States”—which included all waters “the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect interstate or foreign commerce”—exceeded the Corps’ statutory authority in the Clean Water Act and Congress’s constitutional authority in the Commerce Clause.\(^{131}\)

Relying in part on the holding in *Lopez*, the Fourth Circuit agreed with a portion of the defendants’ arguments and ordered a new trial.\(^{132}\) The court reasoned that, under *Lopez*, the regulated conduct must “substantially affect” interstate commerce in order to invoke the Commerce Clause power.\(^{133}\) Because the Corps purported to regulate waters that “could affect” interstate commerce—without regard to whether there was any actual effect, substantial or otherwise—the Fourth Circuit concluded that the Corps exceeded its authority.\(^{134}\) Although the Fourth Circuit strongly suggested that the Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction exceeded the constitutional grant of authority under the Commerce Clause,\(^{135}\) it ultimately invalidated the

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\(^{126}\) See id. at 551.

\(^{127}\) See id. at 558-59.

\(^{128}\) See *United States v. Wilson*, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997). In *Wilson*, the three-judge panel unanimously agreed that the convictions in the district court should be reversed and remanded for a new trial, and a two-judge majority concluded that a portion of the Corps’ regulatory definition of “waters of the United States” exceeded the statutory authorization of the Clean Water Act. See id. at 257 (Niemeyer & Payne, JJ. joining in part II of the opinion).

\(^{129}\) See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c), 1311(a).

\(^{130}\) See *Wilson*, 133 F. 3d at 254, 256.

\(^{131}\) Id. at 256-57 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3)(1993)) (emphasis in opinion but not in regulation).

\(^{132}\) See id. at 255-57.

\(^{133}\) See id. at 256.

\(^{134}\) See id. at 256-57.

\(^{135}\) See id. at 257 (“Were this regulation a statute duly enacted by Congress, it would present serious constitutional difficulties, because, at least at first blush, it would appear to exceed congressional authority under the Commerce Clause.”).
challenged portion of the regulations solely on the ground that it exceeded the congressional authorization under the Clean Water Act.\footnote{See id.}

As \textit{Wilson} never reached the Supreme Court,\footnote{Following remand, one defendant pled guilty to a single felony county, which it later unsuccessfully attempted to vacate. \textit{See United States v. Interstate Gen. Co.}, 152 F. Supp. 2d 843 (D. Md. 2001), \textit{aff’d sub nom.}, United States v. Interstate Gen. Co., L.P., 39 F. App’x 870 (4th Cir. 2002).} it was only binding precedent in the Fourth Circuit,\footnote{See \textit{Bonner v. City of Prichard}, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (“the decisions of one circuit are not binding on other circuits”); \textit{Duran-Quezada v. Clark Constr. Grp., LLC}, 582 Fed. Appx. 238, 239 (4th Cir. 2014) (“the decisions of other circuits are not binding”). The Fourth Circuit has appellate jurisdiction over the federal district courts of Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia.} and the stricken language remained in the regulations of the Corps and EPA until the release of the 2015 Clean Water Rule.\footnote{See \textit{33 C.F.R.} § 328(a)(3) (2014); 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2014).}

\textbf{The Corps’ 2000 Guidance in Response to Wilson}

Although the Corps did not modify its regulatory definition of “waters of the United States” in response to \textit{Wilson}, it did publish guidance in March 2000 on the effect of the decision on its Section 404 jurisdiction.\footnote{\textit{See Final Notice of Issuance and Modification of Nationwide Permits}, 65 Fed. Reg. 12,818 (March 9, 2000).} The Corps explained that, \textit{within the Fourth Circuit only}, “isolated waters” must be shown to have an \textit{actual} connection to interstate or foreign commerce.\footnote{\textit{See id.} at 12,824 (emphasis added).}

“Isolated waters,” in Clean Water Act parlance, are waters that are not navigable-in-fact, not interstate, not tributaries of the foregoing, and not hydrologically connected to such waters—but whose use, degradation, or destruction could affect interstate commerce.\footnote{\textit{See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States}, 547 U.S. 715, 794 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting \textit{Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers}, 531 U.S. 159, 168-69 (2001)) (discussing the meaning of “isolated waters”).} The Corps also deemed drainage ditches constructed in jurisdictional waters to be subject to the Clean Water Act except when the drainage was so complete that it converted the entire area to dry land.\footnote{\textit{See \textit{id.}} at 12,823.}

\textbf{SWANCC}

In 2001, the Supreme Court took up another challenge to the jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water Act in \textit{Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC)}, revisiting the issue for the first time since its 1995 decision in \textit{Riverside Bayview Homes}. In \textit{SWANCC}, the Court evaluated whether Clean Water Act jurisdiction extended to an abandoned sand and gravel pit which contained water that had become a habitat for migratory

\footnote{\textit{See Final Notice of Issuance and Modification of Nationwide Permits}, 65 Fed. Reg. at 12,823, 12,897-98. Under the 2000 Guidance, ephemeral streams must have an ordinary high water mark to be jurisdictional. \textit{Id.} at 12,823.}
birds. Citing the legislative history of the 1972 amendments and the Clean Water Act of 1977, the Corps had argued that the Clean Water Act can extend to such isolated waters under the Migratory Bird Rule.

In a 5-4 ruling, the Court rejected the Corps’ position, and held that the Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction over isolated waters based purely on their use by migratory birds exceeded its statutory authority. The SWANCC Court’s conclusion was informed, in part, by *Lopez* and another landmark Commerce Clause decision issued five years later, *United States v. Morrison*, in which the Court held that Congress lacked constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause to enact portions of the Violence Against Women Act. In light of this jurisprudence, the SWANCC Court concluded that allowing the Corps to assert jurisdiction under the Migratory Bird Rule raised “serious constitutional questions” about the limits of Congress’s authority and “would result in significant impingement of States’ traditional and primary power of land and water use.” Rather than interpret the Clean Water Act in a way that would implicate these “significant constitutional and federalism questions[,]” the Court concluded that Congress’s use of the phrase “navigable waters” in the Clean Water Act “has at least the import of showing us what Congress had in mind for enacting the [act]: its traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be made so.” Based on this reading, the Court concluded that Congress did not intend to invoke the outer limits of the Commerce Clause in the Clean Water Act, and the Corps could not rely on the Migratory Bird Rule as a basis for jurisdiction.

In contrast to *Riverside Bayview Homes*, the SWANCC Court focused less on the legislative history of the Clean Water Act, and instead emphasized the Corps’ original interpretation of the 1972 amendments in which it limited its jurisdiction to navigable-in-fact waters. Although the *Riverside Bayview Homes* Court found that classical “navigability” was of “limited import” in determining Clean Water Act jurisdiction, the SWANCC Court distinguished that case as focused on “wetlands adjacent to navigable waters.” The ponds which formed in the abandoned gravel pits in *SWANCC* were “not adjacent to open water[,]” and therefore lacked the requisite “significant nexus” to traditionally navigable waters necessary for jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act, the Court concluded.

*SWANCC* did not go as far as the Fourth Circuit, however, in striking down an entire subsection of the definition of “waters of the United States.” It limited its holding to the Migratory Bird Rule.

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146 See id at 168-70.
147 Id. at 173-74.
149 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 173 (citing *Lopez* and *Morrison* and stating “[t]wice in the past six years we have reaffirmed the proposition that the grant of authority to Congress under the Commerce Clause, though broad, is not unlimited.”).
150 See id. at 173-74.
151 See id. at 172-74.
152 See id.
153 See id. at 168 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1) (1974)).
155 See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167-68.
156 See id. at 167 (emphasis in original).
Rule, which the Corps described as an effort to “clarify” its regulatory definition. But while its direct holding was arguably narrow, SWANCC’s rationale was much broader and called into question whether the Corps and EPA could assert jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act over many wholly intrastate isolated waters. The relationship between SWANCC’s limited holding and the Court’s broader rationale generated considerable litigation over the scope of the Clean Water Act.

**Agency Guidance in Response to SWANCC**

The general counsels for the Corps and EPA added their voices to the post-SWANCC debate in a joint memorandum issued on the last full day of the Clinton Administration, January 19, 2001. Combining the “significant nexus” language from SWANCC with the existing regulatory definition of “waters of the United States,” the agencies concluded that they could continue to exercise jurisdiction over isolated waters so long as the use, degradation, or destruction of those waters could affect other “waters of the United States.” The potential effect on or degradation on existing jurisdictional waters, the agencies reasoned, established the “significant nexus” mentioned in SWANCC.

In January 2003, the Corps and EPA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking regarding how field staff should address jurisdictional issues in the Clean Water Act and which contained a revised joint memorandum on the effect of SWANCC. The agencies later abandoned that proposed rulemaking effort, leaving unanswered questions over federal jurisdiction over isolated waters after SWANCC. These uncertainties caused the Corps and EPA to shift their attention to alternative bases for jurisdiction in defining “waters of the United States”—such as “adjacent wetlands”—and set the stage for the Supreme Court’s next encounter with a Clean Water Act jurisdictional dispute in *Rapanos v. United States*.

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157 See id. at 174.

158 See Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Regulatory Definitions of “Waters of the United States,” 68 Fed. Reg. 1,991, 1,996 (January 15, 2003) (discussing “uncertainties after SWANCC concerning jurisdiction over isolated waters that are both intrastate and non-navigable”). Justice Stevens wrote in his dissent that SWANCC precluded jurisdiction “over all waters except for actually navigable waters, their tributaries, and wetlands adjacent to each.” See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 176-77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).


161 See id. at 3.

162 See id. (“With respect to waters that are isolated, intrastate, and nonnavigable—jurisdiction may be possible if their use, degradation, or destruction could affect other ‘waters of the United States,’ thus establishing a significant nexus between the water in question and other ‘waters of the United States[,]’


Rapanos

*Rapanos* involved a consolidation of two cases on appeal from the Sixth Circuit—*Rapanos* and *Carabell*—both of which concerned the breadth of the Clean Water Act’s jurisdiction over “adjacent” wetlands. In *Carabell*, landowners challenged whether Section 404 jurisdiction extends to “wetlands that are hydrologically isolated from any of the ‘waters of the United States[,]’” and *Rapanos* presented the similar question of whether this jurisdiction includes nonnavigable wetlands “that do not even abut a navigable water.” In both cases, collectively referred to as *Rapanos*, the Sixth Circuit upheld the Corps’ assertion of jurisdiction over the wetland property in question.

Many anticipated that *Rapanos* would provide clarity on the disputes following *SWANCC*. And although a majority of five Justices agreed that the Sixth Circuit decision was flawed, they were not able to agree on a single, underlying standard which would govern future jurisdictional disputes. Instead, a four-Justice plurality opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, and an opinion by Justice Kennedy, writing only for himself, proposed two alternative tests for evaluating jurisdictional waters.

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167 The statutory reference to “adjacent” wetlands contained in Section 404 of the Clean Water Act states “[t]he Governor of any State desiring to administer its own individual and general permit program for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters (other than those waters which are presently used, or are susceptible to use in their natural condition or by reasonable improvement as a means to transport interstate or foreign commerce shoreward to their ordinary high water mark, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide shoreward to their mean high water mark, or mean higher high water mark on the west coast, including wetlands adjacent thereto) within its jurisdiction may submit to the Administrator a full and complete description of the program it proposes to establish and administer under State law or under an interstate compact.” 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344(g)(1) (emphasis added).
170 See *Rapanos*, 547 U.S. at 729-30.
The Competing Approaches Following *Rapanos*

**The Plurality’s Bright-Line Rule:** Writing for a four-Justice plurality, Justice Scalia adopted the bright-line rule that the word “waters” in “waters of the United States” means only “relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water”—that is, streams, rivers, and lakes.172 Wetlands could also be included, but only when they have a “continuous surface connection” to other “waters of the United States.”173

**Justice Kennedy’s “Significant Nexus” Test:** In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy concluded that the Clean Water Act requires a more malleable approach: the Corps should determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether the water in question possesses a “significant nexus” to waters that are navigable-in-fact.174 For wetlands, a significant nexus exists when the wetland, either alone or in connection with similarly situated properties, significantly impacts the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of a traditionally navigable waterbody.175

Lower Courts’ Response to *Rapanos*

With no controlling rationale from the majority, lower courts interpreting *Rapanos* struggled with the question of what analysis to apply in Clean Water Act jurisdictional disputes.176 When a majority of the Supreme Court agrees only on the outcome of a case and not on the ground for that outcome, the holding of the Court which lower courts must follow “may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.”177 While this rule may appear straightforward, it is not always self-evident how courts should identify which Justice’s opinion rests on the “narrowest grounds.”178 Some courts have held that Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test is the narrowest ruling to be derived from *Rapanos*.179 Others concluded that waterbodies that satisfy *either* the plurality test or the “significant nexus” test satisfy *Rapanos* and may be deemed jurisdictional.180 Of the nine circuits that have addressed the issue, all have applied Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test either alone or in combination...
with the plurality’s test, and none have applied the plurality approach alone.\textsuperscript{181} Still, some courts and observers have criticized the significant nexus test as vague and difficult to implement.\textsuperscript{182}

### Agency Guidance in Response to \textit{Rapanos}

The Corps and EPA offered their own interpretation of \textit{Rapanos} through guidance to field officers in 2007,\textsuperscript{183} which the agencies revised and replaced after public comment in 2008.\textsuperscript{184} The 2008 guidance adopted the view taken by some lower courts\textsuperscript{185} that jurisdiction exists over any waterbody that satisfies either the plurality approach or the significant nexus test.\textsuperscript{186} The agencies further deconstructed the jurisdictional analysis into three categories: (1) waters that are categorically jurisdictional; (2) waters that may be deemed jurisdictional on a case-by-case basis; and (3) waters that are excluded from jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act.\textsuperscript{187}

#### Joint Guidance in Response to \textit{Rapanos}

The Corps and EPA issued joint guidance in 2008 in which they reorganized the jurisdictional analysis into three types of waters:

1. **Waters that are categorically “waters of the United States,”** including navigable-in-fact waters, “relatively permanent” tributaries, and wetlands that have a continuous surface connection or unbroken hydrological connection to jurisdictional waters;
2. **Waters that may be deemed “waters of the United States” on a case-by-case basis** upon a finding of a significant nexus with other jurisdictional waters, such as intermittent and ephemeral streams and wetlands that do not meet the criteria above; and
3. **Waters that are excluded from “waters of the United States,”** including swales or gullies and ditches wholly in and draining only upland that do not carry a relatively permanent flow of water.\textsuperscript{188}

In 2011, the Corps and EPA sought comments on proposed changes to the 2008 guidance, which the agencies acknowledged would increase the number of waters regulated under the Clean Water Act.

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\textsuperscript{181} See Precon Dev. Corp. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engr’s, 633 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2011); Bailey, 571 F.3d at 799; Donovan, 661 F.3d at 183-84; United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 74 (2009); United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 822 (2008); Robison, 505 F.3d at 1222; N. Cal. River Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2007) (superseding the original opinion published at 457 F.3d 1023 (9th Cir. 2006)), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1180 (2008); Johnson, 467 F.3d at 66; Gerke Excavating, Inc. 464 F.3d at 725.

\textsuperscript{182} See, e.g., United States v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 605 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (“This test leaves no guidance on how to implement its vague, subject centerpiece.”); Annie Snider, \textit{The Two Words that Rewrote American Water Policy}, POLITICO (May 25, 2016), http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2016/05/obama-wotus-wetlands-rule-supreme-court-000131 (“[A]s definitive as those words [significant nexus] sound, the real problem was—and still is—that nobody has ever known quite what they were supposed to mean.”).


\textsuperscript{185} See supra note 180.

\textsuperscript{186} 2008 Memorandum, supra note 184, at 3.

\textsuperscript{187} See \textit{id.} at 4-11.

\textsuperscript{188} See \textit{id.}
Act in comparison to its earlier post-*Rapanos* guidance.\textsuperscript{189} The potential enlargement of jurisdiction spawned congressional attention, including a letter signed by 41 Senators requesting that the agencies abandon the effort.\textsuperscript{190} Some Members of Congress introduced prohibitions on funding related to the draft guidance in several appropriations bills, but those provisions were never enacted.\textsuperscript{191} Instead, the agencies abandoned pursuit of the 2011 draft guidance in favor of their 2015 effort at defining the scope of “waters of the United States,” the Clean Water Rule.

**The Clean Water Rule**

The Corps and EPA issued the Clean Water Rule in May 2015 in an effort to clarify the bounds of jurisdictional waters in the wake of *SWANCC* and *Rapanos*.\textsuperscript{192} The agencies relied on a synthesis of more than 1,200 published and peer-reviewed scientific reports and over 1 million comments on the proposed version of the rule.\textsuperscript{193} The Clean Water Rule contains the same three-tier structure from the agencies’ 2008 joint guidance, identifying waters that (1) are categorically jurisdictional, (2) may be deemed jurisdictional on a case-by-case basis if they have a significant nexus with other jurisdictional waters, and (3) are categorically excluded from the Clean Water Act’s jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{194} In an effort to reduce uncertainty about the scope of federal jurisdiction, the agencies sought to increase categorical jurisdictional determinations and reduce the number of waterbodies subject to the case-specific significant nexus test.\textsuperscript{195}

\textsuperscript{189} See EPA and Army Corps of Eng’rs. Guidance Regarding Identification of Waters Protected by the Clean Water Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 24,479 (May 2, 2011) (“The agencies believe that under this proposed guidance the number of waters identified as protected by the Clean Water Act will increase compared to current practice . . . .”).


\textsuperscript{194} See id.

\textsuperscript{195} See Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,057 (“The agencies have greatly reduced the extent of waters subject to this individual review . . . .”); Richard M. Glick and Diego Atencio, “Waters of the United States” Not Quite Clear Yet, WATER REP., July 15, 2016, at 3 (“The new rule increases categorical jurisdictional determinations, and is intended to minimize the need for case-specific analyses.”).
Key Provisions of the Clean Water Rule

- The 2015 Clean Water Rule included as categorically jurisdictional waters of the United States
- Traditional, navigable waters, interstate waters, the territorial seas, or impoundments of such waters;
- Tributaries—as newly defined in the Clean Water Rule
- Waters, including wetlands, lakes, ponds, and “similar waters,” that are “adjacent” to traditional navigable waters, interstate waters, and the territorial seas.
- Some waters would remain subject to a case-specific evaluation as to whether they have a significant nexus to traditional navigable waters, interstate waters, and the territorial seas.
- A number of waters are categorically excluded from Clean Water Act jurisdiction, including prior converted cropland, groundwater and certain ditches, and stormwater management systems.

Response to the Clean Water Rule During the 114th Congress

The Clean Water Rule was the subject of significant debate among observers, stakeholders, and Members of Congress, and a 2015 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that EPA violated publicity or propaganda and antilobbying provisions in prior appropriations acts through its promotion of the Clean Water Rule on social media. The 114th Congress also took steps to block its implementation. In January 2016, the Senate and House passed a resolution of disapproval seeking to nullify the Clean Water Rule under the Congressional Review Act. However, President Obama vetoed that resolution, and a procedural vote in the Senate to override the veto failed.

National Association of Manufacturers v. Department of Defense: Jurisdiction over Challenges to the Clean Water Rule

The Obama Administration intended the Clean Water Rule to take effect on August 28, 2015, but 31 states and 53 non-state plaintiffs, including industry associations, environmental groups,

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198 See, e.g., Snider, supra note 182.
205 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico (Environment Department and State Engineer), North Carolina (Department of Environment and Natural Resources), North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South
and others, filed suit challenging its legality.206 The plaintiffs argued, among other things, that the rule exceeded the agencies’ statutory and constitutional authority and did not comply with the rulemaking requirements in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).207 Environmental groups, seven states,208 and the District of Columbia intervened in defense of the rule.209 Before any court could address the merits of the claims, however, an impasse arose over what court was the proper forum for the litigation. Whereas some plaintiffs filed suit in federal district courts, others argued that a judicial-review provision in Section 509 of the Clean Water Act210 gave the U.S. circuit courts of appeals direct appellate-level review over challenges to the Clean Water Rule.

At the district court level, some courts dismissed their suits, concluding that the courts of appeals had exclusive jurisdiction.211 But one district court—the District Court for the District of North Dakota (District of North Dakota)—ruled that it had jurisdiction to review the Clean Water Rule.212 In August 2015, the District Court of North Dakota concluded that the rule was likely to be struck down on the merits, and it granted a motion for preliminary injunction, temporarily barring the Clean Water Rule’s implementation in 13 western states.213 (The court later added another state, Iowa, to the scope of injunction.)214

In the parallel litigation at the appellate level, a Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated and transferred all circuit court cases to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Sixth Circuit).215 In the consolidated, appellate-level litigation, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the agencies should not apply the Clean Water Rule during the pendency of the legal challenges, and it issued a nationwide stay of the rule.216 The Sixth Circuit also concluded

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206 For a description of the parties that filed suit and a list of courts in which they initiated litigation, see Supplemental Notice of Proposed Step One Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. at 32,229-30.


210 See 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b).


216 In re EPA and Dept. of Defense Final Rule, 803 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 2015), vacated sub nom., 713 F. App’x 489
that it—and not the district courts—had exclusive jurisdiction over the challenges to the Clean Water Rule,\footnote{In re EPA and Dept. of Defense Final Rule, 817 F.3d 261, 274 (6th Cir. 2016), rev’d and remanded with instructions to dismiss, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 538 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 617 (2018), vacated by In re EPA and Dept. of Defense Final Rule, 713 Fed. Appx. 489 (Feb. 28, 2019).} setting the stage for the Supreme Court to address the threshold question of which court or courts possess jurisdiction to hear the Clean Water Rule cases.

In National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) v. Department of Defense, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Sixth Circuit and concluded that the Clean Water Act did not provide direct appellate-level jurisdiction over the pending cases.\footnote{Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Def., 538 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 617, 634 (2018).} Section 509 of the Clean Water Act\footnote{33 U.S.C. § 1369(b).} lists seven categories of agency actions subject to direct appellate review, Justice Sotomayor explained in an opinion for the unanimous Court, but a legal challenge to a rule defining “waters of the United States” does not fall within those categories.\footnote{“Congress has made clear that rules like the [Clean Water] Rule must be reviewed first in federal district court[,]” the Court concluded.}\footnote{Id. at 633.}

While NAM resolved the threshold question of which courts can hear challenges to the Clean Water Rule, it did not address the merits of the challenges themselves. Merits challenges soon resumed at the district court level after the 2018 NAM decision. In the interim, while the jurisdictional issue was being litigated, the legal landscape had changed as a result of the Trump Administration’s shift in United States’ policy toward the jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water Act.

### The Trump Administration and “Waters of the United States”

The Trump Administration opposes the Clean Water Rule, and it is in the process of attempting to rescind the rule and replace it with new regulations elaborating on the meaning of “waters of the United States.”

### The Two-Step Rescind and Revise Process

Less than two months after taking office, President Trump issued Executive Order 13778 directing EPA and the Corps to revise or rescind the Clean Water Rule.\footnote{Executive Order 13778, Restoring the Rule of Law, Federalism and Economic Growth by Reviewing the “Waters of the United States” Rule, 82 Fed. Reg. 12497 (issued Feb. 28, 2017).} The executive order instructs the agencies to review the Clean Water Rule for consistency with the Administration’s policy to “ensure that the Nation’s navigable waters should be kept free from pollution, while at the same time promoting economic growth, minimizing regulatory uncertainty, and showing due regard for the role of the Congress and the States under the Constitution.”\footnote{Id. § 1.}
also provides that EPA and the Corps “shall consider” interpreting the jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water Act in a manner consistent with Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Rapanos.  

EPA and the Corps intend to carry out Executive Order 13778 through a two-step process.  

First, they proposed to issue regulations that rescind the Clean Water Rule and recodify the definition of “waters of the United States” that was in place before the agencies issued that rule in 2015.  

Second, they proposed to engage in a separate rulemaking process to develop new regulations that will define the jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water Act.

**Step One Status: Repealing the Clean Water Rule**

In July 2017, EPA and the Corps provided notice and sought comment on a proposed rule (Step One Proposal) rescinding the Clean Water Rule and replacing it with the same text that existed before the Clean Water Rule was promulgated.  

In 2018, the agencies issued a supplemental notice expanding on their legal rationale for repealing the Clean Water Rule and clarifying that the Step One Proposal is intended to rescind permanently the Clean Water Rule in its entirety.  

According to the supplemental notice, a full repeal is necessary because the Clean Water Rule exceeded the agencies’ statutory authority by adopting an interpretation of Justice Kennedy’s Rapanos opinion that was inconsistent with the Clean Water Act and the opinion itself.  

The agencies also argued that the complex legal landscape created by litigation surrounding the Clean Water Rule has undermined the Clean Water Rule’s goal of providing greater clarity regarding the scope of “waters of the United States.” The public comment period for the proposed repeal closed on August 13, 2018.

**Step Two Status: Drafting a New Definition of “Waters of the United States”**

In December 2018, EPA and the Corps unveiled a second proposed rule (Step Two Proposal) that would complete the second step of the repeal and revise process by creating new regulations that substantively redefine “waters of the United States.”  

According to EPA and the Corps, the Step Two Proposal is intended to provide “predictability and consistency by increasing clarity as to the scope of ‘waters of the United States’ federally regulated” under the Clean Water Act.

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224 Id. § 3.  
226 Id.  
227 Id.  
228 Id.  
230 See id. at 32,227 (“The agencies also propose to conclude that the 2015 Rule exceeded the agencies’ authority under the [Clean Water Act] by adopting such an interpretation of Justice Kennedy’s ‘significant nexus’ standard articulated in [Rapanos] as to be inconsistent with important aspects of that opinion and to cover waters outside the scope of the Act.”).  
231 See id. at 32,237-39.  
232 Id. at 32,227. See also Waters of the United States (WOTUS) Rulemaking: Step One – Repeal, EPA.gov (last updated Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.epa.gov/wotus-rule/step-one-repeal.  
234 Id. at 4,154.
agencies also intend the Step Two Proposal to “clearly implement” the Clean Water of Act’s objectives of restoring and maintaining the quality of the nation’s waters while respecting state and tribal authority over land and resources.235 The Step Two Proposal would define “waters of the United States” to include six categories of waterbodies.236

The Trump Administration’s Proposed Definition
Under the Step Two Proposal, “waters of the United States” would be defined as the waterbodies summarized below:237

1. Traditional navigable waters:
2. Tributaries of navigable-in-fact waters that meet the proposal’s new definition of tributary;
3. Ditches that are navigable-in-fact or that meet the definition of a tributary and are constructed in or relocate a tributary or are constructed in an adjacent wetland;
4. Lakes and ponds that: (a) are navigable-in-fact; (b) contribute “perennial” (year-round) or “intermittent” (during certain times of a typical year) flow to navigable-in-fact waters directly or indirectly through other jurisdictional waters or non-jurisdictional waters, provided such non-jurisdictional waters convey downstream perennial or intermittent flows; or (c) are flooded by non-wetland jurisdictional waters;
5. Impoundments of jurisdictional waters other than ditches; and
6. Wetlands adjacent to other jurisdictional waters.

The Step Two Proposal would mark a significant change from post-Rapanos interpretations of “waters of the United States” because it would eliminate the case-by-case “significant nexus” evaluation that has been part of EPA and the Corps’ guidance and regulations since 2007.238 According to the agencies, improvements to the definitions of “adjacent wetland” and “tributary” in the Step Two Proposal would eliminate the need for case-specific significant nexus tests.239

Under the Clean Water Rule, a wetland is adjacent to jurisdictional waters (and therefore subject to Clean Water Act regulation itself) if, among other potential criteria, it meets certain distance requirements from the ordinary high water mark of other jurisdictional waters.240 The Step Two Proposal would largely eliminate the distance evaluation and define “adjacent wetlands” as those wetlands that “abut” (i.e., touch) or have a “direct hydrological surface connection with” other

235 Id.
236 Id. at 4,203-04.
237 See id.
238 See id. at 4,170 (“The agencies propose to eliminate the case-by-case application of Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test, proposing instead the establishment of clear categories of jurisdictional waters . . . .”). See also supra §§ "Agency Guidance in Response to Rapanos" (analyzing post-Rapanos agency guidance incorporating the "significant nexus" test); “The Clean Water Rule” (discussing the application of the significant nexus in the Clean Water Rule).
239 See id. at 4,197 (“The proposed rule’s specific tributary and adjacent wetlands definitions would eliminate the need for the case-specific significant nexus test that was required for many features after Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Rapanos and according to the agencies’ Rapanos Guidance.”).
240 The Clean Water Rule defines “adjacent” as “bordering, contiguous, or neighboring” other jurisdictional waters. Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,107. “Neighboring” is defined as waters located: (1) within 100 feet of the ordinary high water mark of a navigable-in-fact water, interstate water, the territorial seas, jurisdictional tributary, or impoundment; (2) in the 100-year floodplain and within 1,500 feet of the ordinary high water mark of a traditional navigable water, interstate water, the territorial seas, jurisdictional tributary, or impoundment; or (3) located within 1,500 feet of the high tide line of a navigable-in-fact water or the territorial seas and waters located within 1,500 feet of the ordinary high water mark of the Great Lakes. See id.
Evolution of the Meaning of “Waters of the United States” in the Clean Water Act

Tributaries under the Step Two Proposal must contribute flow to traditionally navigable waters through other jurisdictional waters or non-jurisdictional waters that convey downstream perennial or intermittent flows. Under the Clean Water Rule, by contrast, a tributary is any water that contributes flow to jurisdictional waters that have a bed, bank, and ordinary high water mark.

Select Changes in the Step Two Proposal

Proposed changes in the Step Two Proposal compared to the Clean Water Rule include

- elimination of the significant nexus test;
- removing Clean Water Act jurisdiction over “ephemeral waters” that flow or pool only in response to precipitation and certain ditches that contain ephemeral flows or are “upland” from other jurisdictional waters;
- requiring water to flow continuously year-round or during certain times of the year for Clean Water Act jurisdiction;
- including only lakes and ponds that are traditionally navigable waters subject to federal jurisdiction or that are connected to such waters through tributaries;
- removing interstate waters—or waters which form part of state’s boundary—as an independent category of waters subject to the Clean Water Act; and
- narrowing wetlands jurisdiction to include only wetlands that abut jurisdictional waters or that have a direct hydrological connection to such waters, and excluding wetlands separated by a berm, dike, or other barrier if they lack a direct hydrological surface connection in a typical year.

The Applicability Date Rule: Suspending the Clean Water Rule During the Two-Step Process

In addition to the two-step repeal and replace plan, the Trump Administration has engaged in a third rulemaking process designed to suspend the Clean Water Rule until February 2020. While the Clean Water Rule states that it is effective as of August 28, 2015, EPA and the Corps

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241 Step Two Proposal, 84 Fed. Reg. at 4,155. In addition, whereas “adjacent” wetlands under the Clean Water Rule can include wetlands separated by constructed barriers, natural river berms, dunes, and other barriers; wetlands that lack a direct hydrological surface connection because they are separated by upland, dikes, or other barriers would not be meet deemed “adjacent” in the Step Two Proposal. Compare Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,107 (“The term adjacent means bordering, contiguous, or neighboring a [jurisdictional water], including waters separated by constructed dikes or barriers, natural river berms, beach dunes, and the like.”) with Step Two Proposal, 84 Fed. Reg. at 4,155 (“Wetlands physically separated from [jurisdictional waters] by upland or by dikes, barriers, or similar structures and also lacking a direct hydrological connection to such waters are not adjacent.”).


243 Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,105 (“The terms tributary and tributaries each mean a water that contributes flow, either directly or through another water . . . . to a water identified [as a “water of the United States”] that is characterized by the presence of the physical indicators of a bed and banks and an ordinary high water mark. These physical indicators demonstrate there is volume, frequency, and duration of flow sufficient to create a bed and banks and an ordinary high water mark, and thus to qualify as a tributary.”).


published a separate final rule (Applicability Date Rule), which adds a new “applicability date” of February 6, 2020, to the Clean Water Rule.246

The Trump Administration’s impetus for the Applicability Date Rule is derived, in part, from the Supreme Court’s NAM v. Department of Defense decision.247 Prior to NAM, the Sixth Circuit’s nationwide stay of the Clean Water Rule prevented EPA and the Corps from applying the Clean Water Rule anywhere in the United States.248 But after NAM concluded that challenges to the rule must begin in federal district courts, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the consolidated appellate-level challenges and vacated its stay.249 With no nationwide stay in place and with the step-one repeal rule still in proposed form, the Clean Water Rule could have reverted into effect in states that were not subject to a district court injunction.250 Seeking to prevent reactivation of the Clean Water Rule in some parts of the country, EPA and the Corps promulgated the Applicability Date Rule in an effort to suspend the Clean Water Rule while the agencies undertake the two-step repeal and revise process.251

Like many prior rules related to the definition of “waters of the United States,” litigants challenged the Applicability Date Rule in federal courts.252 In late 2018, two federal district courts determined that EPA and the Corps did not comply with administrative rulemaking requirements in promulgating the Applicability Date Rule.253 By declining to consider comments on the substantive merits of the pre-Clean Water Rule regulations, the agencies deprived the public of a “meaningful opportunity” to comment on the Applicability Date Rule in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, the courts held.254 Both courts issued orders vacating the


247 See Applicability Date Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. at 5201-02 (contending that NAM “is likely to lead to uncertainty and confusion as to the regulatory regime applicable . . . ”).


250 See Applicability Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. at 5,202 (“[W]hen the Sixth Circuit’s nationwide stay expires, the 2015 [Clean Water] Rule would be enjoined under the District of North Dakota’s order in States covering a large geographic area of the country, but the rule would be in effect in the rest of the country pending further judicial action or rulemaking by the agencies.”).

251 See id. (“The agencies continue to work as expeditiously as possible on the two-step rulemaking process. Addition of an applicability date to the 2015 [Clean Water] Rule will result in additional clarity and predictability and will ensure the application of a consistent interpretation and definition of ‘waters of the United States’ nationwide during the pendency of these rulemaking efforts.”).

252 See infra note 255.


254 S.C. Coastal Conservation League, 318 F. Supp. 3d at 963 (“T]he agencies’ refusal to consider or receive public comments on the substance of the WOTUS Rule or the 1980s regulation did not provide a ‘meaningful opportunity for comment . . . ‘”); N. Carolina Growers’ Ass’n, Inc. v. United Farm Workers, 702 F.3d 755 (4th Cir. 2012); Puget Soundkeeper Alliance, 2018 WL 6169196, at *5 (“By restricting the content of the comments solicited and considered, the Agencies deprived the public of a meaningful opportunity to comment on relevant and significant issues in violation of the APA’s prenotice and comment requirements.”)
Applicability Date Rule nationwide. As a consequence, there currently is no instrument (either a final rule or court order) that bars application of the Clean Water Rule on a nationwide basis.

The Legal Landscape for the 116th Congress

The multitude of legal challenges related to “waters of the United States” has created a complex legal landscape for the 116th Congress. Because both rules in the Trump Administration’s rescind-and-replace process are still in proposed form, the Obama Administration’s Clean Water Rule remains the current regulation defining waters of the United States. However, post-NAM challenges to the Clean Water Rule have proceeded at the U.S. district court level, and three federal district courts have entered preliminary injunctions barring application of the Clean Water Rule during the pendency of the suits. At the same time, these district courts have limited the scope of their injunction to the specific states that brought legal challenges to the Clean Water Rule. The ultimate result is that the Clean Water Rule currently is enjoined in 28 states, but it is the current enforceable regulation in 22 states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories.


257 See Order Limiting the Scope of Preliminary Injunction to the Plaintiffs, North Dakota v. EPA, No. 3:15-cv-59, ECF No. 79, at 4 (D.N.D. Sep. 4, 2015) (“Because there are competing sovereign interests and competing judicial rulings, the court declines to extend the preliminary injunction at issue beyond the entities actually before it.”); Georgia, 326 F. Supp. at 1370 (“The Rule jointly promulgated by the EPA and the Army Corps . . . is hereby enjoined in the States of Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, North Carolina, South Carolina, Utah, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and the Commonwealth of Kentucky.”); Texas, 2018 WL 4518230, at *2 (“[A]fter additional review, the Court finds it inappropriate to issue a nationwide preliminary injunction in this case.”).

258 See infra Figure 2.
Figure 2. Status of the Clean Water Rule

While finalization of the Trump Administration’s Step One and Step Two Proposals could bring greater uniformity to this fragmented legal landscape, those rules are also likely to engender new litigation. The focus of future lawsuits, if filed, is likely to depend on the rulemaking process and content of the final rules. But observers expect critics to challenge whether EPA and the Corps considered sufficient scientific data and provided an adequate rationale to depart from prior agency guidance and regulations that utilized Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” test. While critics of that test argue that it is too unpredictable for the average landowner to determine whether a waterbody is part of the “waters of the United States,” opponents of the Trump Administration’s policy contend that the Step Two Proposal would also introduce new technical definitions that ordinary landowners would not be able to implement without hiring a specialist.


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261 See, e.g., Tony Francois, Will We Soon Have Clarity on Navigable Waters?: How the Supreme Court’s October 2017 Term Set the Stage, 19 FEDERALIST SOCY’R REV. 90, 93 (2018) (“[I]nterpretation of navigable waters frequently boils down to ‘I know it when I see it’ subjective determinations by EPA or Army Corps field staff.”).

262 See, e.g., Ariel Wittenberg, Trump’s WOTUS: Clear as Mud, Scientists Say, GREENWIRE (Feb. 18, 2019),
Proposed Legislation

Because the “waters of the United States” debate hinges on the meaning of a statutory term, Congress could enact legislation that seeks to define the jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water Act more clearly. Some Members of the 115th Congress introduced legislation that would have amended the Clean Water Act by providing a narrower definition of “waters of the United States.” Other legislation introduced in the 115th Congress would have repealed the Clean Water Rule or allowed EPA and the Corps to repeal the Clean Water Rule without regard to the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. While none of the proposed legislation in the 115th Congress was enacted, at least one bill introduced in the 116th Congress proposes to repeal the Clean Water Rule and narrow the Clean Water Act’s definition of jurisdictional waters.

Conclusion

The debate over the jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water Act implicates complex and overlapping concerns of environmental protection, statutory interpretation, federalism, and constitutional law. While judicial interpretations of “waters of the United States” generally have followed broader trends in understanding of the scope of the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court’s inability to identify a unified rationale in Rapanos has caused significant confusion and debate over the outer reaches of the Clean Water Act in the following years. Both the Obama Administration (in the Clean Water Rule) and the Trump Administration (in its rescind and revise process) have sought to provide clarity by promulgating new definitions of “waters of the United States” in EPA and the Corps’ regulations. But both Administrations’ efforts have faced criticism and legal challenges from certain stakeholders, creating a fragmented legal landscape for the 116th Congress in which “waters of the United States” means different things in different parts of the nation. Because the “waters of the United States” debate hinges on the meaning of a statutory term, Congress could provide greater clarity and uniformity by amending the Clean Water Act to define its jurisdictional scope more clearly, but legislative proposals thus far have not been enacted.

https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060121251 (contending that the Step Two Proposal will require installation of specialized equipment and consultation with experts to determine whether particular waterbodies are “intermittent” or “ephemeral”).

263 See H.R. 1261, 115th Cong. § 3 (2017); H.R. 7914, 115th Cong. § 2(b) (2018).
264 See, e.g., H.R. 1105, 115th Cong. § 2 (2017). See also S.Res. 12, 115th Cong. (2012) (expressing the sense of the Senate that the Clean Water Rule should be withdrawn or vacated).
265 See, e.g., H.R. 3219, 115th Cong. § 108 (as engrossed in the House July 27, 2017). For additional background on legislation introduced in the 115th Congress, see CRS R44525, supra note 196, at 9-10.
267 See supra § “Background.”
268 See supra § “Rapanos.”
270 See § “The Legal Landscape for the 116th Congress.”
### Appendix. Table Concerning Major Federal Actions Related to “Waters of the United States” in the Clean Water Act

#### Table A-1. Major Federal Actions Related to “Waters of the United States” in the Clean Water Act

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 1, 1974</td>
<td>The Corps issues final regulations defining “navigable waters” under the Clean Water Act.</td>
<td>39 Fed. Reg. 12,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 25, 1975</td>
<td>The Corps publishes final interim regulations revising the definition of “navigable waters.”</td>
<td>40 Fed. Reg. 31,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 28, 1975</td>
<td>EPA adopts the Corps’ definition of “navigable waters” under the Section 404 program.</td>
<td>40 Fed. Reg. 41,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 5, 1979</td>
<td>Attorney General Ben Civiletti publishes opinion that EPA has ultimate responsibility to determine jurisdictional waters.</td>
<td>43 Op. Att’y Gen. 197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 19, 1980</td>
<td>The Corps issues a proposed rule with a definition of “waters of the United States” that continues to differ from EPA.</td>
<td>45 FR 62,732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 22, 1982</td>
<td>The Corps issues an interim final rule adopting EPA’s definition of “waters of the United States.”</td>
<td>47 FR 31,794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 13, 1985</td>
<td>EPA’s General Counsel writes a memorandum on the applicability of the Migratory Bird Rule.</td>
<td>1985 WL 195307</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

271 For purposes of this table, the Clean Water Act refers to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 and subsequent amendments and related legislation.
### Evolution of the Meaning of "Waters of the United States" in the Clean Water Act

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 4, 1985</td>
<td>The Supreme Court decides <em>United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc.</em> concluding that “adjacent wetlands” are “waters of the United States.”</td>
<td>474 U.S. 121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1988</td>
<td>EPA publishes a wetlands delineation manual.</td>
<td>See note 272, infra272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 9, 2000</td>
<td>The Corps publishes guidance on the effect of Wilson and on other nontraditional “waters of the United States” including ephemeral streams, intermittent streams, and drainage ditches.</td>
<td>65 Fed. Reg. 12,818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 9, 2001</td>
<td>The Supreme Court holds that the Corps cannot exercise jurisdiction over waters or wetlands based solely on the Migratory Bird Rule in <em>Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC).</em></td>
<td>531 U.S. 159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

272 The 1988 EPA manual is no longer publicly disseminated or available on EPA’s website; however, several secondary sources discuss the manual. See, e.g., HEIMLIC ET AL., supra note 114, at 11-12; WAKELEY, supra note 116, at 3.

Congressional Research Service
## Evolution of the Meaning of "Waters of the United States" in the Clean Water Act

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<th>Date</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 15, 2003</td>
<td>The Corps issues proposed rulemaking addressing how field staff should address jurisdictional waters issues, but it is never finalized.</td>
<td>68 Fed. Reg. 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 19, 2006</td>
<td>The Supreme Court issues a plurality decision in <em>Rapanos v. United States</em> and <em>Carabell v. United States Army Corps of Engineers</em>.</td>
<td>547 U.S. 715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2, 2011</td>
<td>The Corps and EPA seek comments on proposed guidance which would increase the number of waters regulated under the Clean Water Act; the proposed guidance is never finalized.</td>
<td>76 Fed. Reg. 24,479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 21, 2014</td>
<td>The Corps and EPA issue the proposed Clean Water Rule.</td>
<td>79 Fed. Reg. 22,188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 29, 2015</td>
<td>The Corps and EPA issue the final Clean Water Rule.</td>
<td>80 Fed. Reg. 37,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 9, 2015</td>
<td>The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stays the application of the Clean Water Rule.</td>
<td>803 F.3d 804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 28, 2017</td>
<td>President Trump issues Executive Order 13778 directing EPA and the Corps to revise or rescind the Clean Water Rule.</td>
<td>82 Fed. Reg. 12497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 11, 2018</td>
<td>EPA and the Corps unveil proposed regulations redefining “waters of the United States” in accordance with Executive Order 13778.</td>
<td>84 Fed. Reg. 4,154</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Congressional Research Service; based on sources cited in this report.
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