Libya and U.S. Policy

Ten years after the start of a 2011 uprising that toppled longtime authoritarian leader Muammar al Qadhafi, Libya has yet to make a transition to stable governing arrangements. Elections and diplomacy have produced a series of interim governments (Figure 1), but militias, local leaders, and coalitions of national figures backed by competing foreign patrons have remained the most powerful arbiters of public affairs.

Conflict re-erupted in Libya in April 2019, when a coalition of armed groups led by Qadhafi-era military defector Khalifa Haftar known as the Libyan National Army movement (LNA, in Arabic: “Libyan Arab Armed Forces,” LAAF) leveraged support from Russia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt to attempt to seize the capital, Tripoli, from an interim Government of National Accord (GNA) and local militias. With Turkish military support, the GNA and western Libyan militias forced the LNA to withdraw. Libya has remained divided since, with foreign forces remaining present and the main opposing coalitions separated by a line of control west of Sirte (Figure 1).

During 2020, multilateral diplomatic initiatives helped achieve a ceasefire, and in April 2021, the United Nations (U.N.) Security Council endorsed plans to deploy civilian ceasefire monitoring personnel at Libyans’ request.

Delegates to a U.N.-convened Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) and members of Libya’s House of Representatives (HOR, interim parliament last elected in 2014) have approved an interim executive authority and interim Government of National Unity (GNU). The U.N. Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) is facilitating discussions among LPDF members, the HOR, and the High Council of State (HCS, an advisory representative body) to establish a constitutional basis and law for parliamentary and presidential elections planned for December 24, 2021 (the seventieth anniversary of Libyan independence). U.S. officials continue to call for an end to foreign interference in Libya and for holding the elections as scheduled.

U.N. Endorses Ceasefire Monitoring

In October 2020, U.N.-backed talks among members of a Joint Military Commission (JMC, or “5+5” because of its equal make-up of GNA/LNA delegates) established a temporary ceasefire. The agreement called for the departure of mercenaries and foreign fighters along with the suspension of foreign training and the departure of trainers. The ceasefire has held through May 2021, although foreign forces have not departed. In April 2021, the U.N. Security Council endorsed Resolution 2570, approving the “scalable and incremental deployment” of ceasefire monitors and strongly urging member states “to respect and support the full implementation of the ceasefire agreement, including through the withdrawal of all foreign forces and mercenaries from Libya without delay.” U.N. officials plan initially to deploy five unarmed monitors to Tripoli.

On May 21, UNSMIL head Ján Kubiš said, “progress on key issues such as the reopening of the coastal road between Sirte and Misrata and the start of the withdrawal of foreign mercenaries, fighters and foreign forces has stalled. …UNSMIL continues to receive reports of setting up of fortifications and defensive positions along the Sirte-Jufra axis and South Libya, air force training activities, cargoes of arms and military supplies into West, East, and South Libyan military bases; as well as the continuing presence of foreign elements, mercenaries and assets, thus entrenching the division of Libya.”

Figure 1. Libya: Areas of Influence

2011 Uprising topples Muammar al Qadhafi.
2014 Constitutional referendum and parliamentary elections.
2015 International mediation yields agreement to form Government of National Accord (GNA).
2016 Parliament withholds endorsement of GNA. Islamic State forces defeated in Sirte with U.S. military support.
2018 Libyan National Army consolidates control in east Libya.
2019 Libyan National Army launches offensive against Tripoli.
2020 U.N. supports ceasefire negotiations, selects Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) members. LPDF agrees to roadmap, plans December 2021 elections.

Source: Prepared by CRS using media and social media reporting.
U.S. officials reported in January 2021 that forces affiliated with the Wagner Group of Russia were constructing sophisticated defensive fortifications in LNA-controlled central Libya. Turkish military advisors continue to train and assist western Libyan forces in accord with a 2019 Turkey-GNA security agreement. Both sides have recruited and deployed Syrian militias. Fighters from neighboring Chad left Libya in April 2021 and launched operations that resulted in the death of Chad’s long-time president, Idriss Déby. The U.S. Embassy in Libya asserted that the Chadian fighters’ offensive “again highlights the urgent need for a unified, stable Libya with control over its borders.”

Civilian Protection and Human Rights
Through December 2020, fighting between LNA forces, GNA supporters, and anti-LNA militias had killed more than 500 civilians and displaced more than 200,000 people according to U.N. estimates. U.N. officials estimate that as many as 1.2 million people in Libya (out of 7 million) will require some form of humanitarian assistance in 2021. U.N. agencies have identified more than 575,000 foreign migrants, more than 245,000 internally displaced persons, and more than 43,000 refugees in Libya. Migrants remain especially vulnerable to extortion and other abuses.

Interim Government of National Unity
In 2020, U.N. officials selected and convened a 75-member Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) to restart the country’s disrupted political transition. Based on an agreed roadmap, in February 2021, members of the LPDF nominated an interim three-person Presidential Council and interim Prime Minister to replace the GNA and lead the country until elections in December 2021. Mohamed Menfi of the eastern city of Tobruk serves as chairman of the Presidential Council, with southerner Musa Al Koni and westerner Abdullah Al Lafi as his deputies. On March 10, the House of Representatives (HOR) approved the cabinet proposed by interim Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dabaiba, an engineer and former Qadhafi-era official from the western city of Misrata.

Oil Sector Recoveries, Finances Strained
Libya has the largest proven crude oil reserves in Africa, but conflict, political rivalry, and neglected infrastructure impede the energy sector’s operations. As of April 2021, Libya produced roughly 1.2 million barrels of oil per day, down from 1.4 million barrels per day in 2011. Oil revenues accrue to a National Oil Corporation account in accordance with an U.N.-brokered agreement. Since 2011, public debt has deepened and currency reserves have declined. Millions of Libyan households depend on public sector employment and subsidies, which dominate state spending. Ongoing disputes over the leadership of state financial institutions, oil sector spending, and budget priorities underscore the continued influence of political rivalries on state finances.

Conflict Hampers COVID-19 Response
Years of division and conflict have weakened the Libyan health care system’s ability to mitigate risks from Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19). In May 2021, UNSMIL reported that “the COVID-19 pandemic continued to overwhelm the health system in Libya.” Libyan officials have reported more than 177,000 COVID-19 cases and more than 3,000 COVID-19 deaths. Testing and public health monitoring capacity remain limited.

U.S. Policy and Outlook
For years, U.S. diplomats and officials have emphasized political solutions to Libya’s conflicts, but have not convinced or compelled Libyans and their various patrons to disengage from confrontation. U.S. officials support UNSMIL-led negotiation processes and welcomed the establishment of the interim executive authority and GNU. U.S. Special Envoy for Libya and Ambassador to Libya Richard Norland emphasizes U.S. support for holding elections in December 2021 and for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Libya as required by the October 2020 ceasefire agreement. In May 2021, a State Department spokesperson said “this includes the need for the departure of Russian mercenary and proxy forces, Turkish forces and all foreign military forces, mercenaries, proxies and foreign fighters, including those from Syria, Chad and Sudan, and the need to end any support for foreign military intervention, including from the UAE.” U.S. officials continue to balance Libya-related concerns with other U.S. goals in relation to foreign actors.

U.S. officials engage Libyans and monitor U.S. aid programs via the Libya External Office (LEO) at the U.S. Embassy in Tunisia. Press reports suggest that the Administration is assessing the security and logistical requirements necessary to return U.S. diplomats to Libya on a full time basis. The U.S. military has supported U.S. diplomatic initiatives in recent years and has monitored and reported on the activities of Russian mercenaries and military equipment in Libya. U.S. forces have conducted intermittent targeted strikes against terrorist targets in Libya (most recently acknowledging strikes in September 2019) citing the 2001 AUMF as well as constitutional authorities. According to UNSMIL, as of 2021, the Islamic State organization and Al Qaeda fighters have been “operationally weakened” in Libya but remain a threat. In May 2021, UNSMIL reported that these groups “represent a direct threat against civilian targets, government institutions and the United Nations.”

The U.N. Security Council has authorized financial and travel sanctions on those responsible for threatening “the peace, stability or security of Libya,” obstructing or undermining “the successful completion of its political transition,” or supporting others who do so. In parallel to these U.N. measures, U.S. executive orders provide for U.S. sanctions on those threatening peace in Libya.

Congress has conditionally appropriated funding for transition support, stabilization, security assistance, and humanitarian programs for Libya since 2011. In the 117th Congress, companion legislation introduced in the House of Representatives and Senate (H.R. 1228 and S. 379), would authorize future U.S. assistance, provide a legislative basis for U.S. sanctions, and establish new reporting requirements. Congress allocated not less than $30 million in FY2021 aid for “stabilization assistance for Libya, including support for a United Nations-facilitated political process and border security” under P.L. 116-260.

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