WTO Disciplines on U.S. Domestic Support for Agriculture

Trade is critical to the U.S. agricultural sector: Exports account for about 20% of total U.S. agricultural production. Some commodities—such as cotton, wheat, and soybeans—have export shares of nearly 50% or greater. As a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the United States has committed to abide by WTO rules and disciplines, including those that govern domestic farm policy.

WTO Disciplines of Domestic Support

A farm support program can violate WTO commitments in two principal ways—first, by exceeding spending limits of certain market-distorting programs and, second, by generating distortions that spill over into the international marketplace and cause significant adverse effects.

The Agreement on Agriculture (AoA)

The WTO’s AoA spells out the rules for countries to determine whether their policies for any given year are potentially trade distorting, how to calculate the costs of any distortion, and how to report those costs to the WTO in a public and transparent manner.

WTO Classification of Domestic Support

The WTO uses a traffic light analogy to group programs.

- **Green box** programs are minimally or non-trade distorting and are not subject to any spending limits.
- **Blue box** programs are described as market-distorting but production-limiting. Payments are based on either a fixed area or yield or a fixed number of livestock and are made on less than 85% of base production. As such, blue box programs are not subject to spending limits.
- **Amber box** programs are the most market-distorting programs and are subject to strict aggregate annual spending limits. They are cumulatively measured by the aggregate measure of support (AMS) subject to the de minimis exemption (explained below).
- **Prohibited programs** include certain types of export and import subsidies and non-tariff trade barriers that are not explicitly included in a country’s WTO schedule or identified and accepted in the WTO legal texts.
- **De minimis exemptions** are spending that is sufficiently small (less than 5% of the value of production)—relative to either the value of a specific product or total production—to be deemed benign.

By leaving no constraint on spending in the green box while imposing limits on AMS spending, the WTO encourages countries to design their domestic farm support programs to be more green box compliant and less market distorting. The majority of U.S. domestic agricultural support outlays have been categorized as green box (Figure 1) and thus not subject to the amber box limit.

Under the AoA, U.S. amber box outlays are limited to $19.1 billion annually, subject to de minimis exemptions.

Most U.S. commodity support outlays are notified as amber box: either product- or non-product-specific (Figure 2). However, direct payments (DPs) were notified as decoupled, green box income support and were excluded from the amber box limit. DPs were repealed by the 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79).

Figure 1. U.S. Annual WTO Notifications by Category

Source: U.S. annual notifications to the WTO through 2016.
Note: PS = product specific; NPS = non-product specific.

Since 1995, the United States has stayed within its AMS limits (Figure 2). However, U.S. compliance has hinged on judicious use of the de minimis exemptions in a number of years (e.g., 1999-2001 and 2005) to exclude substantial amber box spending (including crop insurance subsidies) from counting against the AMS limit.

Figure 2. U.S. Amber Box Outlays, De Minimis Exemptions, and the Amber Box Spending Limit

Source: U.S. annual notifications to the WTO through 2016.
Notes: PS = product specific; NPS = non-product specific.
The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM)
In addition to payment limits, a market-distorting program may be challenged under the WTO’s SCM rules when the program’s effects spill over into international markets—that is, if it can be established that a subsidy causes significant adverse market effects.

SCM Rules on Adverse Market Effects
Based on past WTO decisions, several criteria are used to establish whether a subsidy for a particular commodity could result in significant market distortions with resultant adverse effects. First, the subsidy must meet the following criteria:

- The subsidy constitutes a substantial share of farmer returns or of production costs for a commodity.
- The subsidized commodity is important to world markets as a significant share of either production or trade.
- A causal relationship exists between the subsidy and adverse effects in the relevant commodity market.

Then the “market distortion” of a policy must have measurable market effects on trade and/or market price for the commodity:

- Did the subsidy displace or impede the import of a like product into the domestic market?
- Did the subsidy displace or impede the export of a like product by another WTO member country?
- Did the subsidy (via overproduction and resultant export of the surplus or displacement of previous imports) result in significant price suppression, price undercutting, or lost sales in the international market?
- Did the subsidy result in an increase in the world market share of the subsidizing member?

For an SCM violation to be meaningful, another WTO member country must successfully challenge the violation under the WTO dispute settlement process.

Dispute Settlement Understanding
The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) provides a means for members to resolve trade disputes. For a farm program that is challenged under the DSU, members must first attempt to settle their dispute through consultations, but if these fail, the challenging member may request a WTO dispute settlement panel to review the matter. In the event of a SC McMahon, the panel would review relevant trade and market data and make a determination of whether the program resulted in a significant market distortion. Following the SCM guidelines cited above, a subsidy may be found to be actionable or prohibited.

WTO actionable subsidies (i.e., policies that incentivize overproduction and result in lower market prices or altered trade patterns) must be withdrawn or altered to minimize or eliminate the subsidy’s distorting aspect.

WTO prohibited subsidies (i.e., certain export- and import-substitution subsidies) must be stopped or withdrawn “without delay” in accordance with an abbreviated timetable.

U.S. Policy Choices Under Scrutiny
Because U.S. farm commodities play such important roles in so many markets, U.S. farm policy is often subject to intense scrutiny both for compliance with WTO rules and for its potential to diminish or impede the success of future multilateral negotiations—in part because a farm bill locks in U.S. policy for several years, during which it would be difficult to accept new restrictions on U.S. farm programs.

WTO Cotton Case: The Ultimate Example
The importance of SCM rules was made salient by the “WTO cotton case,” in which a WTO dispute settlement panel ruled against both U.S. cotton support programs and GSM-102 export-credit guarantees. As a result of the ruling and the potential for WTO-sanctioned retaliation, the United States made substantial policy changes to bring the related programs into WTO compliance.

Evaluating WTO Compliance
Based on AoA and SCM rules, a farm program can be evaluated against five successive questions to determine how it is classified, whether spending is within the AMS limit, and whether it is vulnerable to WTO challenge:

1. Do outlays qualify for the green box?
2. Do outlays qualify for the blue box?
3. If amber, do outlays qualify for _de minimis_ exemption?
4. Are remaining amber box outlays less than the $19.1 billion amber box limit?
5. Even if within AoA limits, does the program result in adverse effects in the international market?

2018 Farm Bill Sets U.S. Farm Policy Direction
Current U.S. farm policy is authorized by the 2018 farm bill (P.L. 115-334) through crop year 2023. The 2018 farm bill largely maintains the farm safety net established under the 2014 farm bill (P.L. 113-79), including the revenue-support programs—Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) and Price Loss Coverage (PLC). Because of their decoupled design, the U.S. Department of Agriculture has notified spending under ARC and PLC as non-product specific. Combined outlays for ARC and PLC were $5.3 billion in 2014, $7.8 billion in 2015, $7.0 billion in 2016, and an estimated $2.3 billion in 2017. These rather substantial outlays have been exempted from counting against the U.S. amber box limit under the _de minimis_ non-product-specific (NPS) exemption (Figure 2).

More Information

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