Taiwan: Select Political and Security Issues

Taiwan, which officially calls itself the Republic of China (ROC), is an island democracy of 23.6 million people located across the Taiwan Strait from mainland China. U.S.-Taiwan relations have been unofficial since January 1, 1979, when the Carter Administration established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and broke formal diplomatic ties with self-ruled Taiwan, over which the PRC claims sovereignty. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA, P.L. 96-8; 22 U.S.C. 3301 et seq.), enacted on April 10, 1979, provides a legal basis for this unofficial bilateral relationship. It also includes commitments related to Taiwan’s security. For discussion of economic issues, see CRS In Focus IF10256, U.S.-Taiwan Trade Relations, by Karen M. Sutter.

Taiwan’s Modern History

In 1949, after losing a civil war on mainland China to the Communist Party of China, the Kuomintang (KMT), moved the ROC seat of government to Taipei. The KMT continued to assert the ROC to be the sole legitimate government of all China. In 1971, however, U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2758 recognized the PRC’s representatives as “the only legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations,” and expelled “the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek,” the ROC’s then-leader. Taiwan remains outside the United Nations. Taiwan today claims “effective jurisdiction” over Taiwan, the archipelagos of Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu, and some smaller islands. It also claims disputed islands in the East and South China Seas.

The KMT maintained authoritarian one-party rule on Taiwan until 1987, when popular pressure forced it to allow political liberalization. Taiwan held its first direct presidential election in 1992 and its first direct parliamentary election in 1996. The May 2016 inauguration of current President Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) marked Taiwan’s third peaceful transfer of political power from one party to another.

In January 2020 elections, voters elected President Tsai to a second four-year term with 57.1% of the vote. The DPP lost 7 seats in the 113-seat legislature, but retained its majority, with 61 seats. The KMT now controls 38 seats, a gain of 3. The results empowered Tsai to move forward with an agenda that includes demanding “respect from China” for what she calls Taiwan’s “separate identity.” Events in Hong Kong are credited with contributing to Tsai’s strong showing in the election. Taiwan’s widely lauded response to the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic has since bolstered public support for her further.

U.S. Commitments Related to Taiwan

The PRC seeks to enforce a “one China principle,” under which other countries affirm that Taiwan is part of China. The United States adheres to its own “one-China policy,” which the Trump Administration presents as based on U.S.-PRC joint communiqués concluded in 1972, 1978, and 1982, the TRA, and the “Six Assurances” that President Ronald Reagan communicated to Taiwan in 1982, shortly before the release of the third U.S.-PRC joint communiqué.

In the communiqués, the United States recognized the PRC as the “sole legal government of China”; acknowledged, but did not affirm, “the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China”; and pledged to maintain only unofficial relations with Taiwan. In the 1982 communique, the United States stated “that it intends gradually to reduce its sale of arms to Taiwan.”

Key provisions of the TRA include the following:

- Relations with Taiwan shall be carried out through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), a private corporation. (AIT Taipei performs many of the same functions as U.S. embassies elsewhere and is staffed by U.S. government personnel assigned or detailed to AIT.)
- It is U.S. policy “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”
- The United States “will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”

The Six Assurances, which the Trump Administration declassified in 2020, include assurances that the United

Figure 1. Taiwan

Sources: Graphic by CRS. Map generated by Hannah Fischer using data from NGA (2017); DoS (2015); Esri (2014); DeLorme (2014).
States did not agree to consult with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan, did not agree to set a date for ending such arms sales, and did not agree “to take any position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan.” The same declassified cable states that U.S. commitments to China on Taiwan arms sales are “premised on a continuation of the PRC policy of seeking a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue.”

In September 2020 Senate testimony, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs David Stilwell confirmed that it remains U.S. policy to leave the question of Taiwan’s sovereignty “undeclared and to be worked out between the two parties,” meaning Taiwan and the PRC. He emphasized that the United States insists that PRC-Taiwan differences “be resolved peacefully and through dialogue, not with coercion or use of force.” The TRA does not require the United States to defend Taiwan, but states that it is U.S. policy to maintain the capacity to do so, creating “strategic ambiguity” regarding the U.S. role in the event of conflict between the PRC and Taiwan.

**Trump Administration Policy**

The Trump Administration has sought to strengthen bilateral relations with Taiwan, even as the Administration states that it remains committed to the framework of unofficial U.S.-Taiwan relations. In August 2020, Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar became the first U.S. cabinet member to visit Taiwan since 2014. In September 2020, Under Secretary of State for Economic Growth, Energy, and the Environment Keith Krach became the highest-ranking State Department official to visit Taiwan since 1979. In January and May 2020, U.S. Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo issued statements congratulating Tsai, respectively, on her reelection and the start of her second term, making him the highest-level U.S. official ever to have issued such statements. The PRC has urged the United States to “stop official interactions and moves aimed at upgrading substantive relations with Taiwan” and increased its military activity near Taiwan.

An increasingly prominent element of U.S. policy is an effort to help Taiwan strengthen its relations with other countries, particularly the 15 countries that maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan rather than the PRC. In 2019, Japan joined the United States and Taiwan as a formal member of the Global Cooperation and Training Framework, which convenes workshops to share Taiwan’s expertise with other countries. Also in 2019, the United States and Taiwan launched Indo-Pacific Democratic Governance Consultations, to help Indo-Pacific countries address governance challenges, and a new Pacific Islands Dialogue, to help “meet the development needs of Taiwan’s diplomatic partners in the Pacific.” The United States is also partnering with Taiwan to provide development assistance in the Western Hemisphere, home to nine of Taiwan’s diplomatic partners.

Although the United States terminated its Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan in 1980, it engages with Taiwan’s military through dialogues, training, and arms sales, with a focus on encouraging Taiwan to field “credible, resilient, and cost-effective capabilities.” The Trump Administration has notified Congress of 14 proposed major Foreign Military Sales cases for Taiwan, with a combined value of about $13.2 billion. The U.S. Navy has so far conducted 11 Taiwan Strait transits in 2020, compared to 10 in all of 2019. On June 9, 2020, a U.S. Navy C-40 transport plane flew over Taiwan with Taiwan’s permission.

**The PRC, Taiwan, and “One China”**

The PRC maintains that mainland China and Taiwan are parts of “one China” whose sovereignty cannot be divided. The PRC’s 2005 Anti-Secession Law commits Beijing to “do its utmost with maximum sincerity to achieve a peaceful unification” with Taiwan. It states, however, that in the case of Taiwan’s “secession” from China, or if the PRC concludes that possibilities for peaceful unification have been exhausted, “the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” In 2019, PRC leader Xi Jinping recommitted the PRC to peaceful unification, but reserved the option to use force. He called for exploring a “Taiwan plan for ‘one country, two systems,’” a reference to an arrangement under which mainland China and Taiwan would be parts of one country, but maintain different political and other systems, as in Hong Kong. After China’s June 2020 imposition of a national security law on Hong Kong, President Tsai declared the approach “not viable.”

Unlike her KMT predecessor, President Tsai has not endorsed the “1992 consensus,” under which Taiwan and the PRC acknowledged “one China,” but retained their own interpretations of what it meant. In a BBC interview after her reelection, Tsai said, “We don’t have a need to declare ourselves an independent state. We are an independent country already and we call ourselves the Republic of China (Taiwan).” In 2016, the PRC suspended contacts with Taiwan’s government over Tsai’s unwillingness to endorse the “1992 consensus.”

Since 2016, the PRC has established diplomatic relations with eight countries that previously recognized Taiwan: first the Gambia, then Sao Tome and Principe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, and Kiribati. The PRC has stepped up military patrols and exercises around Taiwan, including sending military aircraft across the median line of the Taiwan Strait. The PRC has also blocked Taiwan’s attendance as an observer at annual World Health Assembly meetings, which Taiwan attended from 2009 to 2016. The PRC has offered carrots, too: 2018’s “31 measures” and 2019’s “26 measures” sought to improve living and working conditions for Taiwan people in mainland China.

**Select Legislation in the 116th Congress**

Section 1258 of the Senate-passed National Defense Authorization Act for FY2021 (S. 4049) would state that it is U.S. policy that U.S. Armed Forces will maintain the capacity “to deny a ‘fait accompli’ operation by the [PRC] to rapidly seize control of Taiwan.” Both the Senate bill and the House-passed William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for FY2021 (H.R. 6395) would urge “practical training and military exercises” with Taiwan. The Senate bill would state that it is U.S. policy for such activities to include, “as appropriate, the Rim of the Pacific exercise, combined training at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, and bilateral naval exercises and training.” Both bills would call for port calls in Taiwan with U.S. Navy hospital ships USNS Comfort and USNS Mercy.
Disclaimer
This document was prepared by the Congressional Research Service (CRS). CRS serves as nonpartisan shared staff to congressional committees and Members of Congress. It operates solely at the behest of and under the direction of Congress. Information in a CRS Report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to Members of Congress in connection with CRS’s institutional role. CRS Reports, as a work of the United States Government, are not subject to copyright protection in the United States. Any CRS Report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without permission from CRS. However, as a CRS Report may include copyrighted images or material from a third party, you may need to obtain the permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or otherwise use copyrighted material.